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ABSTRACT 
Hong Kong’s poverty alleviation policies have undergone significant changes in 
the last 70 years.  From the earlier colonial years when no monetary public 
assistance was available, to the more recent times when the Government openly 
admitted the poverty problem and introduced different measures to assist the 
disadvantaged group, poverty has become a more and more important social issue 
that has drawn the attention of the Government and the public, especially given 
Hong Kong’s status as an international financial centre. 
 
This report studies Hong Kong’s poverty alleviation policies since the Second 
World War, when Hong Kong had very limited social welfare policies supporting 
the poor, and the Government did not take an active role to tackle poverty.  The 
first major change came in 1971, when the colonial government started 
distributing public assistance in cash.  The public assistance underwent subtle 
and gradual change since then, until after the handover, when the Government set 
up the Commission on Poverty in 2005, raising poverty alleviation to a notable 
position in the policy agenda.  More policy measures were introduced after 2005 
to support the poor, with the Government even setting up an official poverty line 
in 2013 to formally identify the poor population.  While it is easy to notice these 
v 
major policy development and changes, to gain a more thorough understanding of 
the evolution of poverty alleviation policies, it is necessary for one to observe the 
policy changes more closely, taking into account of the various factors involved in 
the policymaking process, and analyse the gradual policy adjustments between the 
major policy changes, across an extended period of time. 
 
To better understand the policymaking process, a detailed study into the policy 
decisions and instruments involved in both the colonial and post-colonial era is 
conducted.  Empirical research is conducted to construct a full picture of Hong 
Kong’s poverty alleviation policies from 1945 up to the present, based on official 
government documents, research from scholars and social welfare organisations, 
and other relevant resources.  Using the information gathered, a refined model of 
the Social Construction Theory is applied, which takes into consideration the 
socio-political context, governance arrangements and policymaking dynamics, to 
analyse the evolution of poverty alleviation policies.  As a whole, the report aims 
at understanding how the policies have evolved, offering an explanation on why 
the changes happened, and identifying the implications that the policy 
development process and evolution carry on the governance. 
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CHAPTER 1  INTRODUCTION 
 
Focus and Objectives of the Project 
 
Poverty alleviation is a social issue that has gained traction in Hong Kong in 
recent years.  With the Government re-instating the Commission on Poverty in 
2012 and announcing the official poverty line in 2013, poverty alleviation has 
become an important issue in the Government’s policy agenda (Government of 
HKSAR, 2015).  It appeared that the Government put a heavy emphasis on 
tackling poverty, and appeared to be proud of its achievements.  According to 
the Government (Government of HKSAR, 2015, P. vii), Hong Kong’s poor 
population in 2014 dropped from 1.32 million before policy intervention to 0.65 
million after policy intervention (including cash benefits and other means-tested 
in-kind benefits).  It is pertinent to address what the Government has done over 
time to bring down the number of the poor.  This entails understanding the issues 
and critically reviewing the Government’s policies. 
 
The project studies how social construction and the changes of the governance 
 2 
arrangements influenced the policy decisions and instruments for poverty 
alleviation, and their evolution from the colonial era to the present under the 
current Chief Executive, LEUNG Chun-ying (“CE LEUNG”). The policy 
decisions and instruments in turn instigate the dynamics in the social construction 
framework.  The empirical research on poverty alleviation policies in Hong 
Kong is therefore structured, guided and informed by theoretical frameworks of 
modes of governance on policy-making, policy design and social construction, 
and instruments and strategies in public policy. 
 
Through a holistic view of the Government’s poverty alleviation policies in the 
last 70 years, the project aims at studying and analysing the policy development 
process, in hopes of understanding how the policies have evolved, offering an 
explanation on why the changes happened, and identifying the implications that 
the policy development process and evolution carry on the governance. 
 
 
Research Questions and Associated Propositions 
 
In the report, the following research questions are addressed: 
 3 
 
1. What policy processes, decisions and instruments are likely to be involved in 
the responses of governments to the need to alleviate poverty? 
 
2. What have been the actual processes, decisions and instruments in the poverty 
alleviation responses of the Hong Kong Government – and in what ways have 
they changed over time? 
 
3. How might these processes, decisions and instruments be transformed in the 
light of the experience to-date? 
 
To answer these questions, the poverty alleviation policies from 1945 to the 
present would be studied and analysed, so as to identify and discuss the policy 
processes, decisions and instruments involved in policymaking.  The broad 
assumption is that the policy agenda and selection of policy tools in the 
Government’s poverty alleviation policies have been greatly influenced by the 
mode of governance and how the poor have been socially constructed.  Policies 
evolve based on the following factors at each period of time: the socio-political 
situation (such as the economy and political situation); the culture and institution 
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concerning the issue (poverty); the social construction of the target population 
(the poor); as well as the governance arrangement and policymaking dynamics.  
A more detailed review of these factors for each period involved would be 
provided in the empirical research part of this report. 
 
On the whole, it is argued that the dependent poor was ostensibly un-constructed 
in the colonial era which led to insufficient and ineffective policy tools being used, 
and the generally passive attitude of the poor population in Hong Kong.  
Towards the handover of sovereignty back to China and thereafter, the advocacy 
of the welfare sector, and the heightened level of democracy in legislature and 
administration have been driving fundamental changes in the social construction 
of the target populations, which brings about the prominence of the poverty 
alleviation agenda, emergence of various types of policy tools, and more active 
participation of the welfare sector and the poor population. 
 
 
Overview of the Analytical Framework 
 
To guide the analysis of the subject policy evolution, an integrated model, which 
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composes of five main building blocks would be used.  Basically, Social 
Construction Theory (SCT) is the main theoretical component to explain policy 
evolution.  SCT argues that policy evolution is a “feed-forward” process 
(Schneider, Ingram and DeLeon, 2014), i.e. policy contents (i) frame the social 
construction of the policy recipient and affect their reactions, (ii) shape social 
culture and institution, and (iii) influence interaction of policymaking dynamics.  
The interactions among stakeholders that take place within the dynamics will 
determine the final outputs of revised policy contents (Schneider, Ingram and 
DeLeon, 2014). 
 
SCT framework merely focuses on the variables within the particular policy arena 
but it is argued that certain policy options are already filtered out subject to the 
constraints of the socio-political conditions and the governance arrangements.  
To rectify the limitations of the SCT framework, the integrated model will counter 
the macro socio-political context and then the governance arrangement at the 
material time to ascertain how social situations and the composition of the 
governance machine would filter the feasible policy options before policymakers 
start to craft the particular policy contents.  In the sequence of analysis, theses 
exogenous factors would firstly be handled prior to disposing of the endogenous 
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factors.   
 
Apart from applying the SCT to analyse the policy evolution, the integrated model 
would be further refined by applying the theories of policy instrument and policy 
process.  Policy instrument theories would facilitate the conceptualisation of 
those policy designs.  By understanding the nature and functions of a particular 
policy design, it would help one to better understand why a particular policy 
design was selected at the material time.  The final component of the refined 
model is to apply the relevant concepts from the policy process theories.  The 
purpose is to reveal why certain interactions would occur in the policymaking 
dynamics.  Further discussion of the framework is at Chapter 2. 
 
 
Key Timeline and Policy Versions 
 
The research goes along an axis of timeline continuum of Hong Kong’s evolving 
poverty alleviation policies, which is briefly divided into four regimes, namely: 
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Regime Relevant Chapter 
in this report 
1. Policy 1.0: 1945 (post-World War II) – 1971 (before 
the emergence of Public Assistance distributing in 
cash, the predecessor of Comprehensive Social 
Security Assistance) 
Chapter 3 
2. Policy 2.0: 1971 – 1997 (pre-handover of 
sovereignty) 
Chapter 3 
3. Policy 3.0: 1997 – 2012 (post-handover of 
sovereignty, the 1st CoP and its dismissal) 
Chapter 4 
4. Policy 4.0: 2012 – present (the reinstatement of the 
CoP, and the setting up of Poverty Line and other 
forthcoming policies) 
Chapter 5 
 
Based on the above timeline, empirical analysis on the evolution of the poverty 
alleviation policy in each period would be conducted.  To make the analysis 
coherent and consistent, the sequence of components to be disposed in the refined 
model would be overviewing the socio-political context, and the corresponding 
governance arrangements at a particular moment of time.  After considering the 
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scene-setting factors, focus would be placed on how the policy contents structured 
the social construction of target populations, culture and institution.  Techniques 
of policy instruments classification will be applied to articulate and highlight their 
effects.  Lastly, since policy development is an evolving process, efforts would 
be made to reveal how the interaction of preceding factors in the policymaking 
dynamics, i.e. policymakers, target populations, culture and institution, cause the 
policy to be evolved to a subsequent stage.  
 
For easy conceptualisation, it is argued that the evolution of poverty alleviation 
policy can be divided into four stages, namely, Policy 1.0 to Policy 4.0.  A 
change of an integer means that a major leap of policy contents is identified whilst 
the change in decimal places implies that the policy content may have only 
encountered limited adjustments.  However, it is important to note that in reality 
vigorous changes of policy is not likely to happen overnight, but it normally 
undergoes a sequence of minor adjustments and eventually evolves to a new stage 
(Jones and Baumgartner, 2005).  And the “feed-forward” process of SCT also 
depicts that policy change is constrained by numerous factors and that explains 
why certain degenerative form of policy can persist for a long period of time 
(Schneider, Ingram and DeLeon, 2014). 
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In these four stages, the Policy 1.0 (1945 – 1971) was provided in a piecemeal, 
minimal and haphazard manner.  It reflected that the Government did not intend 
to and was not prepared to (in light of its financial positions, manpower and 
capacity) introduce sophisticated policies to tackle poverty issues; Policy 2.0 
(1971 – 1997 (pre-handover)) was characterised as the provision of cash to the 
needy, with the supplement of other small scale initiatives.  After the handover, 
the policymaking process was intensified, with the Government introducing more 
measures to assist the poor.  Policy 3.0 refers to the time when the first 
Commission on Poverty (1st CoP) was established in 2005; this is followed by the 
dismissal of the 1st CoP and re-instatement of the second Commission on Poverty 
(2nd CoP), leading to the present Policy 4.0 in 2012.  More detailed discussion of 
each policy stage can be found in the empirical research in Chapters 3 – 5. 
 
 
Research Methodology 
 
Research and analysis are mainly based on desktop research of publications, 
websites, speeches, reports and papers from the Government and relevant 
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stakeholders, such as welfare organisations, social workers and academics.  For 
the earlier colonial years, owing to limited access to past Government reports and 
papers, it is inevitable that research work conducted by social welfare 
organisations and prominent local researchers in the field has to be relied on.  
For more recent years, where more official Government documents are readily 
available, there is a stronger focus on official documents, such as LegCo papers 
and Policy Addresses.  The Policy Addresses, in particular, are a valuable 
resource for analysing the Government’s poverty alleviation policies, as it shows 
how policy decisions are made, and the intention of the Government under each 
Chief Executive. 
 
Secondary references, such as reports, commentaries, editorials, comments and 
reactions channeled through the press, are also included where relevant and 
applicable.  These references contain the views of various interest groups and 
stakeholders, and can assist in learning about the views of the public at that time. 
 
The research method is considered to be appropriate, as the official documents, 
research work and other secondary references complement each other to provide a 
more comprehensive picture of the policy development process across the three 
 11 
regimes.  As this project focuses on analysing the history of poverty alleviation 
policies in Hong Kong in the past 70 years, it is vital to study any relevant printed 
information available – official documents would be the first priority, followed by 
research work in the field and then other secondary references.  Through these 
materials, the extensive poverty alleviation history of Hong Kong can be 
presented, and it can then facilitate the analysis of the policymaking process in 
detail. 
 
Given the lengthy period of time discussed in this report, there exist difficulties in 
accessing earlier policy documents, especially for the colonial era, when it is no 
longer possible to retrieve the relevant materials on Government websites and 
other sources.  Therefore, various means have been explored to study the 
policies before the handover, including but not limited to accessing earlier 
research work of scholars and reports from social welfare organisations.  For the 
post-colonial years, official documents are more readily available from 
Government websites, hence these documents are studied and analysed, in hopes 
of understanding the policy decisions made by the Government and the changes 
involved. 
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Chapter Outline 
 
The project report is made up of six chapters, including this introduction as 
Chapter 1.  Hereafter, Chapter 2 is the analytical framework.  In this chapter, 
SCT would be introduced and discussed in detail.  To cater for the limitations of 
SCT, a refined SCT model is presented, through considering the socio-political 
context, governance arrangements and policymaking dynamics.  By applying the 
refined SCT model in Chapter 2, Chapters 3 – 5 would be the empirical research, 
covering the span of over 70 years – from 1945 to 2016.  Chapter 3 will cover 
the period before the handover, from 1945 to 1997.  Chapters 4 and 5 will cover 
the post-handover period in greater detail, drawing information from official 
policy documents, and discussing the many measures that the HKSAR 
Government has introduced to support the poor.  This will be followed by the 
conclusion at Chapter 6, where important observations would be drawn from the 
empirical research and the implications on governance would be discussed. 
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CHAPTER 2  ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter serves to establish the analytical framework for analysing the 
evolution of policy decisions and instruments for alleviating poverty of Hong 
Kong.  The analysis covers the period from the rule of the British Colonial 
Government after the Second World War (WWII) to the contemporary 
Administration of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government 
(the Government).  In the period of about 70 years, it is observed that the poverty 
alleviation policy remains by and large steady for a few decades after its major 
principles and content were built, but as time goes by the policy undergoes a 
number of significant changes as the general social conditions and the 
composition and characteristics of the policy recipients evolve. 
 
Apart from stating the objective of the chapter, the second but no less important 
goal of this introductory section is to produce (i) an overview of the analytical 
framework adopted in this project, and (ii) the roadmap of how each major 
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component in the analytical model will be disposed of.  In general, an integrated 
model, which composes of five major components (Figure 1), is applied for 
depicting the momentum that drives the evolution of the poverty alleviation policy 
of Hong Kong over times. 
 
Figure 1: Refined Model for Analysis of Policy Designs and its Evolution 
 
 
The first two components, i.e., the macro socio-political context and governance 
arrangements, are deployed for assessing how factors which are exogenous to a 
single policy arena would actually affect policy change.  It is argued that the 
most significant effect of social context and governance arrangements serve as 
filters which limits the options for policymakers to employ to craft the policy 
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contents.  After handling the exogenous factors, the analysis would then be 
proceeded to look into the specific details within the policy arena guiding by the 
analytical propositions of the Social Construction Theory (SCT), known as the 
third component.  In general, SCT proposes that policy evolves under a 
“feed-forward” process (Schneider, Ingram and Deleon, 2014).  In a nutshell, 
initial policy designs, which consists of both material and symbolic effects, mould 
the social construction of policy recipients and other political settings.  It is those 
policy contents that trigger a series of interrelated effect to the stakeholders, 
culture and institution, and policymaking dynamics within the arena and 
eventually lead to policy change (Schneider and Ingram, 1997).  To further refine 
the analytical power of the model, two additional components are employed, i.e. 
the fourth component is the application of policy instrument theories with a view 
to conceptualising how exactly policy contents fulfil their objectives.  The fifth 
component is the application of policy process theories, as appropriate, to 
articulate how interactions within the policymaking dynamics may come up with 
a new policy.   
 
Based on the infrastructure and the logic of the refined model, section two 
addresses the issues about the macro socio-political context and governance 
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arrangements, which serves as the overall context and scene-setting preceding the 
analytical backbone of SCT.  Section three mainly focuses on the basic 
assumptions and propositions of SCT, followed with the theory’s strengths and 
limitations.  In response to SCT’s limitations, section four introduces the feasible 
ways for refining the SCT framework.  The first refine measure is to introduce 
the method of policy instrument classification for conceptualising the so-called 
material and symbolic effects of policy content in a more concrete manner.  The 
second way is to borrow the relevant concepts and ideas from other policy process 
theories to interpret how interactions of stakeholders within the policy arena take 
place.  Lastly, a recap of the refined analytical model would be produced and 
how this model would be relevant to the analysis of the evolution of poverty 
alleviation policy would be explained. 
 
 
Macro Socio-political Context and Governance Arrangements 
 
Macro socio-political situation affects policy formulation in two obvious ways.  
Firstly, it shapes the social atmosphere and people’s perception about their welfare 
(intangible) which may in turn affect the principle which a government would 
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adopt to make policies.  Secondly, it also determines the amount of public 
resources which a government may mobilise.  In addition, governance 
arrangements – the composition of the governance network / alliance – constrains 
the institutional setting where a government can exercise its power to tackle social 
problems.  Both of them are the pre-determining or exogenous factors and their 
impacts are ubiquitous.  Therefore, in doing the analysis, these two components 
would be disposed of before the specific (poverty) policy issues are considered in 
the general model. 
 
Macro Socio-political Context 
 
Macro socio-political environment is one of the determining factors for policy 
formulation/evolution and tools adoption.  In the refined model, social 
background would be the first condition to be considered to ascertain why the 
Hong Kong Government would adopt any particular approaches or strategies in 
handling poverty problems.  In fact, the influences induced by political stability 
or fluctuation; economic growth or downturn; change of demographic structure, 
e.g. influx of refugees, or aging population; optimistic or pessimistic social moods, 
etc., affect policy formulation and the policy instruments to be chosen.  For 
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instance, in occasions of social unrest, policies that can restore stability would be 
at a higher priority, e.g. welfare policy developed after the riot in 1967.  Besides, 
adverse economic situations may constrain or invoke the government to choose 
particular policy tools to tackle the problems, e.g., freeze of rent of public housing 
after the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997.  Based on the above elaboration, the 
consideration of the macro socio-political context is crucial for understanding the 
policy evolution.   
 
Governance Arrangements 
 
Governance arrangement is another pre-determining factor that governs policy 
formulation and policy tools adoption.  Prior to looking into the propositions of 
SCT, the better approach is to articulate the scene and context from which a policy 
is made.  This component is so important because different governance 
arrangements affect (i) how political institution (mechanism for service delivery) 
is shaped; (ii) which agents would engage; (iii) what rules would be used and their 
subsequent amendment; and (iv) the way which the government may view and 
prioritise the problems.  Its impact goes beyond one single policy issue but the 
overall principle which the government would take to solve social problems.  
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Moreover, the governance arrangements also affect people’s perception about the 
government’s intention, and their expectations towards the government’s actions.  
Therefore, the component of governance arrangement has to be incorporated into 
the refined analytical model to comprehend formulation and evolution of poverty 
alleviating policy. 
 
In light of its complexity, the concepts of types of governance introduced by Knill 
and Tosun (2012) would be adopted to conceptualise the issue.  In brief, Knill 
and Tosun (2012) classified four types of governance, namely, “Regulated 
self-governance”, “Interventionist governance”, “Cooperative governance”, and 
“Private self-governance” in accordance with (i) the degree of government 
obligation (intensity of involvement) and (ii) the degree of public-private 
cooperation (Figure 2).   
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Figure 2: Four Types of Governance 
 
Degree of Public-Private Cooperation 
High Low 
Degree of 
Legal 
Obligation 
High 
Regulated Self 
Governance 
Interventionist Governance 
Low Cooperative Governance Private Self Governance 
Source: Knill and Tosun, 2012, p. 210 
 
It is important to note that the four types of governance are not mutually exclusive 
to each other, i.e. they may be adopted by a government at the same time to tackle 
problems at different policy areas.  The major characteristics of such type of 
governance (arrangement) would be introduced: 
 
“Private self-governance” arrangement shares a very low degree on both legal 
obligation and cooperation between public and private sectors (Knill and Tosun, 
2012).  Under this arrangement, government is basically absent in service 
provision whilst the non-government agents are the key players.  This 
arrangement is so chosen or the situation would happen when a government’s 
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resource is highly insufficient, which undermines the government’s capacity to 
engage those service areas; or it is highly inefficient for the government to provide 
the service, or the government is of little interest to engage the matter.  The 
non-government players would establish the rules among themselves, and enforce 
the rules in the absence of government. 
 
“Cooperative governance” arrangement implies the formulation of policy which is 
a result of bargaining between government and non-government sectors (Knill and 
Tosun, 2012).  Under this arrangement, government and non-government sectors 
enjoy equal status.  They are neither financially dependent to each other nor does 
any party enjoy a more superior role.   
 
“Regulated self-governance” arrangement refers to the setting which the 
government plays a critical role in regulating the rules of the game where the 
non-government sectors also play a dominant role in policy implementation (Knill 
and Tosun, 2012).  The government and the non-governments sectors can be 
regarded as strategic partners where each of them plays a part in pursing the 
governance objective.  However, the arrangement also implies that the 
government would have veto power on decision-making as it monopolise the role 
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in law enactment and it can mobilise public resources to command the 
compliance/ cooperation of other players. 
 
“Interventionist governance” arrangement is at another extreme of the “Private 
self-governance” arrangement.  The government plays the roles of both service 
provision and production.  The non-government sectors are either too incapable 
to engage in policy formulation or they are simply non-existent or disinterested in 
(due to poor incentives) policy formulation.  The government shall play the roles 
of policy formulation, financing, implementation.  
 
It is argued that the adoption of a particular governance arrangement would 
accompany the adoption of certain policy designs and tools, i.e., the higher degree 
of government involvement is, the more sophisticated the policy designs and tools 
would be, and the higher degree of public-private cooperation is required, the 
adoption of the tool of “organisation” or “system changing” would become more 
frequent (Elmore, 1987, and Hood and Margetts, 2013).  
 
After disposed of the variables (macro socio-political context and governance 
arrangement) that are exogenous to a single policy arena, an independent 
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theoretical framework would be employed to unveil how the detailed, specific 
policy contents are crafted by policymakers, how these policy contents affect the 
target recipients, how the recipients are likely to respond, and how various 
stakeholders interact to induce the policy change.  To systemically guide the 
analysis, the theoretical framework of the Social Construction Theory (SCT) 
would be employed. 
 
 
Social Construction Theory 
 
The theoretical framework of SCT is applied to look into the subtleties within a 
policy arena.  Instead of focusing on the macro factors, SCT focuses on the 
details and specificities of a policy.  And by assessing how those small scale, 
piecemeal initiatives would provide the aggregate effects and in turn lead to 
policy change.  In the foregoing paragraphs, the background, characteristics, 
strengths and limitations, and the unique logic for explaining policy evolution 
would be illustrated. 
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Background 
 
SCT was introduced under the context when the persistent policy flaws in many 
policy areas in the United States had undermined people’s confidence to 
democracy (Schneider and Ingram, 1997).  Schneider and Ingram (1997) pointed 
out that the major threat to democracy is not that the long embraced democratic 
values have been abandoned by ordinary people.  Instead, the merits of 
democracy decline as the government fails to make policies that are conducive to 
pursuing the best interests for the public.  On the contrary, the adverse policies 
keep undermining fairness, social justice, citizenship and other admired social 
values (Schneider and Ingram, 1997).  Worse still, Schneider and Ingram (1997) 
argued that the dynamics under which such policies are formed would reinforce 
themselves so problematic policies become endurable. 
 
In view of the unpalatable situation, Schneider and Ingram (1997) criticised that 
none of the approaches – Pluralism, Policy Science, Public Choice Theory and 
Critical Theory – is well-developed to explain the persistence of the policy flaws.  
SCT was so introduced to analyse and comprehend the pitfalls.  SCT mainly 
focuses on assessing policy designs: it serves to (i) explain why and how a policy 
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is formed at its first instance, (ii) articulate the logic of its subsequent evolution, 
and (iii) illustrate (policy) design implications to democracy (Schneider and 
Ingram, 1997; Schneider, Ingram and DeLeon, 2014).  
 
Characteristics of Policy Designs under Social Construction Theory 
 
Policy designs carry a number of characteristics.  Firstly, “policies fit into 
contexts” (Schneider and Ingram, 1997, p.3).  Policy designs are crafted under 
specific social circumstances and historical settings.  Normally, the formulation 
of policies is triggered by certain social problems or responds to particular social 
circumstances.  Thus, context matters in the course of policy formulation.  
Secondly, apart from the instrumental functions, the symbolic meanings 
embedded in the policy designs contain strong implications that shape people’s 
perceptions and behaviors (Schneider and Ingram, 1997).  As such, the 
evaluation of policy should be judged not only by its nominal sense, but also 
considering how the underlying meanings and ideas that policies convey may give 
effect to the policy objectives.  Thirdly, policy elements are observable, e.g. the 
legal provisions, but their contents keep evolving (Schneider and Ingram, 1997).  
Researchers can trace how a particular design may trigger responds from the 
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recipients.  
 
In general, SCT shares some common features of incrementalism.  For instance, 
for both frameworks, policymakers possess incomplete knowledge, share different 
preferences and values, and encounter cognitive bias (assumptions of bounded 
rationality) in decision-making.  Policy normally evolves in a gradual manner at 
its margins rather than undergoes drastic change; path dependency matters as how 
a policy was crafted in the past would affect the options to be shortlisted in the 
future (Hayes, 2013; Jones and Thomas, 2013; and Kay, 2013).  However, what 
makes SCT a distinctive theory is that it highlights the elements of social 
construction of target populations into its analytical framework (Schneider, 
Ingram and DeLeon, 2014).   
 
Social construction plays a critical role in SCT framework.  The element of 
social construction is so influential because it governs the product of policy 
designs at the initial stage of policy formulation as well as its subsequent 
evolution.  SCT argues that policy design is neither an objective nor an 
ambiguous process.  Instead, the crafting of policy designs is largely 
value-driven, and the major underlying force is the social construction of target 
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populations (Schneider, Ingram and DeLeon, 2014).  Once social construction is 
formed, the elements are deeply implanted into the culture (social values, norms 
and people’s perception) and institutions (law, administrative rules and practices), 
making a departure of policy from the status quo difficult (Schneider, Ingram and 
DeLeon, 2014).  The second reason for its huge influence is that the framing of 
social construction is easy to operate, leaving much room for policymakers to 
leverage the tactics to pursue political gains by intently framing target populations 
with certain attributes.  The manner of manipulation of social construction by 
policymakers has profound impact to the quality of governance (Schneider and 
Ingram, 1997; Schneider, Ingram and DeLeon, 2014).  Lastly, Schneider, Ingram 
and DeLeon (2014) argue that social construction establishes a “feed-forward” 
path for policy design and its evolution.  It provides implications that the 
formulation of constructive or degenerative policies hinges on the manipulation of 
social construction of target recipients. 
 
Propositions of Social Construction Theory 
 
Schneider, Ingram and DeLeon (2014) summarised five major propositions of 
SCT which concern about (i) the basis for allocating benefits and burdens to target 
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populations; (ii) feedbacks by target populations to the effects of policy designs; 
(iii) how policy decisions are made; (iv) how social construction changes; and (v) 
the logic of policy change.  The scholars integrated these five propositions to 
come up with a “feed-forward” path which demonstrates the complete process of 
policy formulation (at the first instance) and evolution (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3: Feed-forward Effects: Social Constructions and Policy Design 
 
Source: Schneider, Ingram and DeLeon; 2014, p.108. 
 
Proposition No. 1: This proposition is that “the allocation of benefits and burdens 
to target groups by public policy depends on the extent of their political power as 
well as their positive or negative social construction.” (Schneider, Ingram and 
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DeLeon, 2014, p.109)  Based on the above criteria, Schneider, Ingram and 
DeLeon, (2014) classified target populations into four groups, namely, the 
advantaged, contenders, dependents and deviants.  The following matrix 
demonstrates the common perception of the political power and the deservedness 
of the four target groups (Figure 4).  
 
Figure 4: Political Power and Social Construction of Target Groups 
 
Source: Schneider, Ingram and DeLeon; 2014, p.111 
 
The advantaged have a high level of political power and positive social 
construction.  The high level of political power implies that people have 
relatively abundant resources, knowledge and capacity to organise themselves and 
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articulates their collective preferences to policymakers (Schneider and Ingram, 
1997).  Their preferences on policy have become too influential to be neglected 
so policies are normally crafted in a way that favors their interests.  Besides, the 
advantaged also possess sufficient power to frame themselves with positive social 
images and resist others who try to construct them negatively (Schneider and 
Ingram, 1997).  As they enjoy positive social construction, policies that favor 
their interests usually encounter little opposition even if substantive amount of 
benefits is distributed to them, and policymakers will find it a risky move to 
impose burdens to the advantaged.  
 
Schneider, Ingram and DeLeon (2014) stated that the contenders have a high level 
of political power but are negatively portrayed in their social image by the 
ordinary citizens.  Despite the fact that the contenders possess a huge amount of 
resources, they do not enjoy the political power in the way as the advantaged do. 
To avoid accusations of collusion, policymakers tend to transfer benefits to the 
contenders in subtle and implicit ways in order to avoid public’s criticism 
(Schneider, Ingram and DeLeon, 2014).  Moreover, Schneider and Ingram (1997) 
contends that subject to this power and influence of the contenders, policymakers 
inclined to refrain from distributing burdens to the group, leaving the so-called 
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control and restriction simply a kind of lip-service. 
 
The dependents have little political power subject to their inferior conditions (poor, 
disability, mental disorder, etc.) but they are portrayed with the positive social 
construction as the needy (Schneider, Ingram and DeLeon, 2014).  In allocating 
the benefits (or burdens), policies normally do not pose sanctions, at least not in 
an obvious way, to the dependents as their adverse situations is often not out of 
their own faults.  However, since they lack the resources and representation to 
safeguard their interests as the advantaged possess, policymakers tend to deliver 
benefits which are more in the form of rhetoric than materials (Schneider, Ingram 
and DeLeon, 2014). 
 
The deviants have minimal political power and negative social construction.  
Policymakers tend to impose burdens and provide minimal benefits to deviants 
due to their trivial political power and negative social image (Schneider, Ingram 
and DeLeon, 2014).  The circumstances so happen because very few parties 
would be interested in representing them for safeguard their rights and interests.  
Due to their negative social construction, the public has little tolerance or 
sympathy towards the deviants, and reckons that they deserved to be penalised.  
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Therefore, this perception establishes the norms that policies targeting deviants 
are to allocate them with burdens. 
 
Proposition No. 2: This proposition is that “Policy designs have both material and 
symbolic (reputational and interpretative) effects on target populations that impact 
their attitudes and political participation.  These effects occur through structuring 
of opportunities that shape life experiences and subtle messages about how 
government works and how they are likely to be treated” (Schneider, Ingram and 
DeLeon, 2014, p.116).  Policy consists of both material and symbolic effects.  
For example, if a policy design is to deliver a subsidy of $5,000 per month per 
person to the needy.  The amount of $5,000, obviously, has material effect as it 
has a certain level of purchasing power.  The symbolic effect refers to the kinds 
of value attached, which depends on how the government delivers the money, i.e. 
through what institution, whether it is means-tested, whether the policy is 
temporary or permanent, availability of quota, and most importantly, how the 
recipients are portrayed.  Also, the institutional arrangement for delivering the 
money affects how the recipients perceive themselves, their eagerness to apply for 
the subsidy, and whether they will try to ask for more.  The feedback or political 
participation of the target populations shall affect the policymaking dynamics as 
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their participation will adjust the way the policy problem is defined as well as 
their social construction.  Subject to the (significant or subtle) change of social 
construction of target recipients, it affects the subsequent policy design when the 
policy is reviewed (Schneider, Ingram and DeLeon, 2014). 
 
Proposition No. 3: This proposition is that “Social Construction emerge from 
emotional and intuitive reactions and are justified with selective attention to 
evidence.” (Schneider, Ingram and DeLeon, 2014, p.121)  SCT adopts the 
notions of “bounded rationality” in describing policymakers’ decision-making 
capability.  The theory also applies the concepts of cognitive psychology to 
illustrate how cognitive bias, use of heuristic shortcuts may affect 
decision-making (Cairney and Heikkia, 2014). 
 
Under the decision-making model of “bounded rationality”, people had limited 
cognitive ability to process all the information equally at the same time.  Instead, 
people process information in a serial order, i.e. they handle a portion of 
information at one time, and then dispose of another portion after they finishing 
processing the previous one (Jones and Thomas, 2013).  Jones and Thomas 
(2013) also pinpointed that people incline to react to emotional and intuitive 
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appeals prior to examining objective facts or data when assessing different policy 
options.  Thus, it means that the emotional impulses may outweigh objective 
facts and reasons.  In the same token, the positive or negative social images of 
the target populations may be the first factor appearing in the mind of 
policymakers.  The emotional or intuitive impulses influence policymaker’s (i) 
perception on the nature of problems, (ii) decisions on setting policy goals, and 
(iii) the selection of suitable policy options and tools to tackle the problems.  
Conclusion is driven by emotion, and rationales may be supplemented afterwards 
(Jones and Thomas, 2013).  Moreover, once the social images of the target 
populations are constructed, they form the heuristic shortcuts that guide future 
decision-making when policymakers encounter problems of similar nature or 
circumstances (Jones and Thomas, 2013; and Schneider, Ingram and DeLeon, 
2014). 
 
Schneider, Ingram and DeLeon (2014) quoted some examples of cognitive bias 
and the use of heuristics for decision-making.  For instance, “halo effects” and 
“confirmatory bias”.  “Halo effect” means “the tendency to like (or dislike) 
everything about a person – including things you have not observed…” 
(Kahneman, 2011, p.81); “confirmatory bias” implies that people tends to be 
 35 
attentive to and adopt evidence, information and argument that reinforce their 
existing beliefs (Kahneman, 2011).  These are the two of the many prominent 
examples on how psychological motives affect policymakers.  In gist, 
policymakers tend to attach certain (positive or negative) attributes to target 
populations, and then treat them in the way that adheres to their earlier beliefs. 
 
Proposition No. 4: This proposition is that policy designs may spark off changes 
of social construction.  However, it is difficult to activate such changes 
(Schneider, Ingram and DeLeon, 2014).  When formulating a new policy, 
policymakers predispose a social image of the target populations, and they will 
embed in the policy design (Schneider and Ingram, 1997).  The embeddedness is 
in two senses: firstly, the social construction formed in the past will be 
incorporated into policymakers’ decision heuristics.  In the subsequent rounds of 
policy renewal, policymakers take reference from such heuristics and make their 
decisions (Schneider, Ingram and DeLeon, 2014).  Secondly, Schneider, Ingram 
and DeLeon (2014) argued that the positive and negative social construction 
would be implanted into the culture and institution.  Apart from becoming part of 
the social norms and values, the elements would be materialised through 
legislation and incorporation into administrative procedures and practices.  Such 
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implantation poses a very high threshold level for social construction to change 
significantly.  
 
Proposition No. 5: This proposition is that “types and patterns of policy change 
vary depending on the social construction and power of target groups.” (Schneider, 
Ingram and DeLeon, 2014, p.129)  As mentioned in Proposition 1, the allocation 
of benefits and burdens depends on the political power and social construction of 
the target populations.  Political power and social construction of the target 
populations may gradually evolve.  Policies, at most of the times, will largely 
reinforce and reproduce themselves, but they will undergo changes (at the margins) 
as the power and social image of the target group change. 
 
Main Strengths and Weaknesses of Social Constructions Theory 
 
SCT has a number of strengths in interpreting policy design and its evolution.  
Firstly, SCT provides insights by considering the factors of social construction of 
the target populations (Schneider and Ingram, 1997; Schneider, Ingram and 
DeLeon, 2014).  The theory offers forceful and well-established arguments on 
how social construction affects: (i) target populations’ perception and political 
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participation, (ii) heuristics shortcuts of policymakers, (iii) culture and institutions, 
and (iv) policymaking dynamics which determines the output of the (revised) 
policies (Schneider, Ingram and DeLeon, 2014).  Secondly, the development of 
SCT was inspired by real world problems, i.e. problematic policy design in the 
U.S. (Schneider and Ingram, 1997).  The empirical foundation of SCT implies 
that most of the theoretical components, e.g. institutions, target populations, 
policy measures, etc., are something observable and common in the real world, 
and therefore permitting the theory be applied to study policy issues in any other 
subjects.  In addition, relationships among components are well-established in 
the theory, so it allows causal-linkage of events to be traced within a policy arena 
by studying the dynamics of interaction among the components.  Furthermore, it 
provides implications to policymakers to derive benevolent policies that are 
conducive to good governance (Schneider and Ingram, 1997).   
 
By reviewing the theoretical framework, a number of limitations of SCT are 
identified.  Firstly, the framework rarely examines the impact of exogenous 
factors that may affect policy design and its evolution.  Although the theory 
recognises that context matters, it does not dispose of those relevant 
circumstances in its framework.  For instance, political climate, economic 
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growth and social stability are influential to policy design and change.  However, 
SCT seldom considers how the macro-social conditions may affect policy choices.  
The theory views that a policy arena (system) is a concealed system that is inert to 
the stimulus of external factors (Bardach, 2006).   
 
Secondly, SCT seldom considers how governance principles or arrangements may 
affect policy formulation and policy tools adoption.  Though social construction 
is a crucial factor to determine policy designs; factors, such as the composition of 
the governance alliance or network, government’s preferences and priorities, 
financial position, etc., also play critical roles in policy formulation and policy 
tools adoption.  Actually, governance arrangements are pre-existed to the 
policymaking arena.  Therefore, it is difficult to capture a good understanding of 
policymaking dynamics without comprehending the governance arrangements.   
 
Thirdly, though SCT places much emphasis on policy designs, the theory has not 
developed the sophisticated propositions to reveal how policy designs give effects 
to their objective.  In order to enhance the explanatory power, SCT should 
incorporate the ideas and concepts from the theories of policy instruments for (i) 
classifying the designs, precisely, in accordance with their natures and functions, 
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and (ii) revealing how they are implemented to fulfil their design purposes. 
 
Lastly, SCT neglects the potential of emerging factors that led to policy change.  
SCT assumes policy change under a “feed-forward” process, which is linear and 
sequential.  The major force for policy change is subjected to the change of 
social construction of target populations (Schneider, Ingram and DeLeon, 2014).  
For instance, populations with positive social construction will participate to drive 
policymakers to make policies that safeguard and further enhance their benefits.  
The terms or designs of policy evolve to become more favorable to the groups.  
Policies also tend to impose burdens on groups with little political power and 
negative social construction.  Policies are then amended to become harsher to the 
inferior groups.  The proposition implies that the self-reinforcing mechanism 
will make policies evolve to their extremes.  However, it is observed in many 
real-world cases that the path of policy change does not exactly follow what SCT 
proposes.  Some other external factors (e.g. focusing event) do interfere the 
policymaking dynamics, and in turn affect the policy outcome.  To gain a more 
comprehensive picture of policy change, researchers should drill on how subtle 
factors affect interaction with policymaking dynamics. 
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Ways to refine the Limitations of SCT  
 
Subject to the limitations SCT, two more components would be included into the 
refined model to rectify the possible pitfalls of SCT.  Firstly, the application of 
the theories of policy instruments (Component 4) to conceptualise the nature and 
functions of certain designs (content) of the poverty alleviation policy reveals how 
they function to attain the policy objective.  Secondly, since SCT has left it blank 
regarding the rules of interaction among policy stakeholders within the 
policymaking dynamics, concepts and ideas from other theories of policy process 
may be introduced, as appropriate, to unveil the logical interaction. 
 
Theories of Policy Instruments: the Nature and Functions of Policy Tools 
 
This component is to apply the concepts from various theories of policy 
instruments to (i) classify the policy designs based on their nature and functions; 
and (ii) explore how these policy contents have precisely formed the social 
construction of the target recipients, frame the culture and institution.  The 
component will enrich the explanatory power of proposition 1 – 3 of SCT  
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(Figure 5): 
 
Figure 5: Policy Crafting at its Initial Stage 
 
 
In brief, policymakers apply heuristics short-cuts to assess target populations and 
craft policy design (Proposition 3).  By using various policy instruments, 
benefits and burdens are allocated based on the social construction of target 
populations – “deserving” and “undeserving” (Proposition 1).  As policy tools of 
different nature and function would bring various degrees of material and 
symbolic effects, it would in turn affect their self-perception and eagerness of 
participation (Proposition 2).  Moreover, culture and institution would be shaped 
by implementing those policy instruments (Schneider, Ingram and DeLeon, 2014).   
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To assist the classification of policy design/content, three major policy 
instruments are employed for analysis.  The table below summarises the 
classification of policy tools introduced in the three policy instrument theories 
(Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6: A Summary of Policy Instruments 
 Authority Economic Means Institution Information 
Four major 
classes of 
instruments by 
Elmore   
(1987) 
Mandates 
Inducements and 
capacity-building 
System-changing -- 
“Carrots, Sticks 
and Sermon” by 
Vedung (2007) 
Sticks Carrots -- Sermons 
“NATO” by 
Hood & 
Margettes (2007) 
Authority Treasure Organisation Nodality 
 
Elmore (1987) argued that there were four major types of policy instruments: 
Mandates means the use of rules (coercive power) to regulate people’s behaviour.  
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Inducements mean giving money to recipients in return for compliance or certain 
performance, and is usually to seek short-term results.  Capacity-building refers 
to investment on recipients for long-term and endurable results; while 
System-changing is to alter institutional arrangement in order to make certain 
services available.  System-changing tools may refer to enactment of laws, 
creating new organisations, changing existing administrative procedures, giving 
authority and resources to agencies to perform the required duties.  Elmore’s 
theory does not include information tools.  
 
Vedung classified policy tools in a different way.  Vedung (2007) asserted that 
there were three types of policy instruments.  “Stick” means the use of authority 
to regulate people’s behaviour.  The concept is somewhat similar to Elmore’s 
(1987) “Mandates”.  “Carrots” implies the provision of economic incentives in 
return for certain behaviour but the theory did not specify whether the tool is for 
short-term or long-term purpose.  “Sermon” means the dissemination of 
information to recipients.  However, Vedung (2007) regarded the use of 
institution or organisation as merely a governance strategy instead of a policy 
instrument.  The failure to recognise the use of organisation as a policy tool 
undermines Vedung’s theory to illustrate government’s action.  In fact, 
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governments nowadays are keen to explore and try different forms of institution 
for public service delivery.  A hybrid form of governance structure fused with 
conventional government departments and other public/private organisation are 
commonly adopted in various countries and regions.  Therefore, in the refined 
model, we would go beyond Vedung’s theory and see how the Hong Kong 
Government had used various types of organisation, e.g. Commission on Poverty, 
for making and implementation policy NATO theory (Hood and Margetts, 2007) 
classified policy instruments into regulatory tools (Authority), economic tools 
(Treasure), institutional tools (Organisation) and information tools (Nodality).  
Among these four policy tools, NATO theory further sub-divided the tools into 
effectors and receivers (Hood and Margetts, 2007). 
 
Each theory has its strengths and limitations.  The theory of Hood and Margetts 
(2007) covers four prominent tools but the division of tools into effectors and 
receivers make the analysis unnecessarily complicated.  Vedung’s (2007) theory 
categorised policy tools into three generic types.  However, omission of 
institutional tools limits itself to interpret situations where public services are 
delivered through various forms and nature of governance arrangements.  
Elmore’s (1987) theory delineates the natures and functions between short-term 
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(inducements) and long-term (capacity-building) economic tools, allowing the 
disclosure of government’s intention in finer details.  However, the theory does 
not include information tool, undermining its capacity to interpret how 
government tries to attain policy objectives through delivering information.   
 
Given that no single theory can cover all prominent characteristics of policy 
instruments, the analysis will not stick to one particular theory, but to utilise the 
propositions flexibly to unveil the nature and functions of the tools for alleviating 
poverty.   
 
Relevant Concepts from Other Theories of Policy Process 
 
The last step is to consider how the policymaking dynamics will induce change of 
social construction (Proposition 4) and policy (Proposition 5).  SCT suggests that 
an earlier version of the policy (Policy 1.0), target populations, and culture and 
institution will affect policymaking dynamics.  The resulting forces will 
contribute to future policy designs, which may include change of social 
construction.  To reveal the dynamics of interactions among stakeholders in the 
policymaking dynamics, concepts from other theories of public administration are 
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borrowed, as appropriate, to interpret the dynamics of policy design and its 
evolution.  For instance, in the course of forming the social construction in 
policy design, Multiple Streams Theory (as discussed in Kingdon, 1995; and 
Zahariadis, 2014) may be applied to ascertain if any focusing events occur that 
trigger the policy window which eventually lead to the significant changes in 
social constructions and policy designs. 
 
 
A Refined Model as an Integrated Analytical Framework   
 
The purpose of this project is to apply the refined model, which composes of 
building blocks for disposing of macro factors and micro attributes relevant to a 
policy, to explain formulation and evolution of policy alleviation policy of Hong 
Kong.  In sequence of disposal, the macro socio-political conditions would be 
the first component to be considered.  In fact, the economic conditions and the 
degree of social stability in a particular period of time would confine the scope of 
feasible choices of actions for government to handle poverty problems.  
Governance arrangement concerns about the specification, capacity and function 
of the (government) “machine” for problem-solving.  By knowing the 
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governance arrangement at a particular moment of time, it will assist researchers 
to further shortlist why a particular policy would come in use whilst others are 
further filtered out.  It also implies that policy evolves as the governance 
arrangement changes. 
 
After handling the exogenous conditions, the third component comes to deal with 
how policy is crafted under the theoretical framework of SCT.  Emphasis will be 
placed on how a particular policy has built the social construction of the target 
populations and then led to a chain of reaction (evolution) within the (poverty 
alleviation) policy arena based on the five propositions of SCT.  To further 
enhance the explanatory power of the refined model, the concepts of policy tools 
would be introduced to reveal exactly how policy designs (the instruments), e.g. 
CSSA, establishment of CoP, set up of poverty line, etc., had produced their 
functions (Component 4).  Lastly, special occurrences in the policymaking 
dynamics, if any, would be identified, to ascertain if they had any impact to the 
evolution of poverty alleviating policy. 
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CHAPTER 3  PRE-HANDOVER: 1945 – 1997 
 
Overview of Policy 1.0 and Policy 2.0 Formulation: From a Lack of Public 
Assistance to Public Assistance in Cash 
 
As a starting point of the empirical analysis of Hong Kong’s poverty alleviation 
policies, the period right after the Second World War was chosen, since it laid 
down the basic policy framework and content, marking the beginning of more 
extensive documentations of local history.  In this section, an overview of the 
period of 1945 – 1971, which is labeled as “Policy 1.0”, would be provided, 
setting the scene for the policy change to come.  The period of 1971 – 1997 is 
labeled as “Policy 2.0”, when public assistance was distributed in cash. 
 
It should be emphasised that the policy changes were subtle and slow in the 
colonial era – there was no significant adjustment until 1971, when the 
Government took up the task of providing monetary assistance to the poorest 
families in the city.  This could be owing to the lack of incentives and limited 
financial resources of the colonial government to put forward changes in poverty 
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alleviation policy, until the 1967 riot forced the Government to take concrete 
action to improve its social policy, in order to pacify the citizens and maintain 
social harmony.  Despite the monetary assistance marked a remarkable change in 
the Government’s poverty tackling policies, the amount of the assistance was very 
limited and the recipients could barely sustain life.  The colonial government 
also restricted the type of people eligible for the assistance – in hopes of balancing 
public finance and not causing the public to falsely believe that the assistance 
would turn Hong Kong into a welfare state.  In the process, the image of the poor 
population was constructed – and this carries significant implications in future 
policymaking and in the public’s view of the poor. 
 
Following the analytical framework in Chapter 2, the socio-political background 
before Policy 2.0 would be explored, and then the governance arrangements at the 
time would be analysed.  This will be followed by a discussion of the target 
populations and the culture and institution at the stage.  By applying the 
analytical framework to Policy 2.0, and the elements in the refined SCT model 
would be discussed.  After discussing the elements in the policy stages, the 
policymaking dynamics would be elaborated, explaining how Policy 1.0 evolved 
to Policy 2.0.  This chapter will end with how Policy 2.0 paved the way for the 
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policy changes that happened after the handover. 
 
 
Pre-Policy 2.0: Socio-political Background (1945 – 1971) 
 
In the 1950s and 1960s, it was commonly understood that the vast majority of the 
local citizens were living in poverty (Caritas, 1997); however, poverty was not 
perceived as a preeminent social problem that had an urgent priority in the 
Government’s policy agenda.  
 
After the Second World War, the population of Hong Kong increased dramatically, 
from 0.6 million in 1945 to 2.2 million in 1950.  More than 1 million refugees 
escaped from Mainland China, a trend that had begun when China was invaded by 
Japan in the 1930s and 1940s, and still continued after 1945, initially because of 
the Chinese Civil War, and subsequently because of fear for the Communist Party.  
Since a lot of refugees escaped in a hurry, they had almost no possessions, and 
were generally very poor (Chow, 2014).  The huge influx of refugees presented a 
considerable challenge to the British colonial government. 
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Shek Kip Mei’s shantytown had been housing a considerable amount of 
immigrants from China.  In 1953, the Shek Kip Mei fire burnt down the 
shantytown, causing tens of thousands of people to lose their home.  As a 
remedial measure, the Government built temporary housing and two-storey 
bungalows to house the unfortunate immigrants.  It was only a temporary 
measure to cater for the homeless immigrants, as it was generally perceived that 
the immigrants would return to its motherland when the turbulent situation in 
China became clear (Chow, 2014). The temporary housing solution may not be a 
clear cut poverty alleviation policy, though it served to provide accommodations 
and alleviate the hardship of the poor and refugees in the society.  
 
In the Yearbook of 1958, the Government announced that taking into 
consideration of the public finance, it would strengthen its work in four areas: 
building schools to provide places for children; constructing public housing 
estates to house people without a shelter; strengthening public hygiene facilities; 
ensuring that people would have access to clean water (Chow, 2014).  While it is 
speculated that these measures might be taken in response to the Double Ten Day 
riot in 1956, it cannot be denied that these measures also improved the living 
standard of the citizens, and were in particular welcoming to the people living in 
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poverty.  Other than those policy initiatives (“Treasure tools”), the Government 
provided not much further assistance to the needy. 
 
Obviously, the provision of Government housing served multiple social purposes 
at that time.  However, whether the provision of Government housing should be 
categorised an intended and independent policy for tackling poverty is subjected 
to debate even up to the present day.  Regardless of the Government’s intention, 
it should be acknowledged that Government housing has always housed a 
considerable amount of the poor and needy in the society throughout the years, 
and certainly has helped with alleviating poverty. 
 
In the 1960s, with the ongoing influx of refugees from Mainland China, the 
Government continued providing low-cost housing to accommodate the poor.  
Some refugees who were relocated to resettlement estates transferred their 
wooden houses in the mountains to the newly immigrated refugees, so the 
housing needs of local people remained, pressuring the Government to provide 
even more affordable housing.  The Government did not provide direct monetary 
assistance to the poor in 1950s and 1960s, yet the living standard of the poor was 
improved along with the development of the city’s infrastructure. 
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It was commonly perceived that the 1967 riot was the turning point of Hong Kong 
governance.  By looking into the consequence of the riot, it led to terrifying 
social unrest which changed the policymaking dynamics.  It is argued that the 
1967 riot was one of the major reasons, if not the most significant reason, that 
acted as the catalyst to the policy change, from government providing only 
limited subsistence assistance to providing monetary assistance.  The colonial 
government was surprised to find that a considerable amount of people 
participated in the riot, which, in some cases, could be attributed to the rioters’ 
Communist background or tendencies, but more importantly to the administration, 
it also showed some citizens were clearly dissatisfied with the social situation, 
and it shook the foundation of the colonial regime (Chan, 2011).  The riot caught 
the government off guard, as it did not realise that some citizens were living under 
such strong discontent.  The incident caused the government to reflect on its 
social and welfare policy, and poverty became an area that the government would 
put an emphasis on when formulating policies.  Hence, the policy change led to 
the distribution of public assistance in the form of cash, an effort that the 
government hoped would appease the disgruntled low-income group, which made 
up the majority of the local population. Policy 2.0 – namely the distribution of 
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public assistance in cash – was formed in response to the political instability and 
the 1967 riot.  The turbulent social context played a huge part in leading to the 
policy change. 
 
The economic growth of the city is another external factor contributing to the 
policy change.  According to the World Bank (2016), Hong Kong’s GDP per 
capita more than doubled from 1960 to 1970, from US$429,400 to US$960,000.  
Through the 1960s, Hong Kong began to develop and expand its labour-intensive 
manufacturing industry.  While people were still generally poor, the developing 
manufacturing industry led to an emergence of the so-called “middle class” – 
people with a job and relatively stable income, and children who could afford to 
receive education.  While the income gap between the rich and poor was 
widening, the economic inequality was still not the focus of the society; it 
nonetheless made the Government notice the importance of catering for the less 
affluent people in the society, especially for those who could not benefit from the 
opportunities made available by market economy (Haddon-Cave, 1980, in Chan, 
2011). 
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Pre-Policy 2.0: Governance Arrangement 
 
In the early 1950s, there were no concrete Government policies which specifically 
tackled the poverty problem, owing to fiscal constraints of the colonial 
government.  The Government merely maintained and distributed basic supplies, 
without providing further assistance to the poor and needy; the non-existent 
welfare policy of Hong Kong at the time gave the impression that the 
Government’s guiding principle was “laissez-faire” (Chan, 2011).  The poor 
often had to rely on supplies from social welfare organisations and churches.  
The colonial government left the task of providing welfare services to three 
charitable organisations: the District Watch Force, the Tung Wah Group of 
Hospitals, and the Po Leung Kuk (Chan, 2011). The state of social welfare 
showed that the modes of governance were mainly Private self-governance, with a 
lack of public-private cooperation and limited legal obligation.  The task of 
assisting the poor was mostly left to non-government sectors.  It was only until 
the Shek Kip Mei fire occurred in 1953 that the Government took action to cater 
for some of the less advantaged groups in the society. 
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Pre-Policy 2.0: Evolving Social Culture 
 
During the course of Policy 1.0, in the absence of an intended and well-designed 
poverty alleviating policy, it did not impose much impact to the social norm and 
value, or the development of institution (for policy implementation).  In the first 
generation of policy, the factor of social construction did not stir up significant 
reaction in the (poverty alleviation) policymaking dynamics.  Therefore, it is 
argued that the evolution from Policy 1.0 to 2.0 was still mainly motivated by the 
change of socio-political background and governance arrangements. 
 
 
Pre-Policy 2.0: Evolving Target Population 
 
Though the Government had taken measures to alleviate the adverse conditions of 
the poor, no evidence was shown that a well-structured, target-oriented poor 
alleviating policy was formulated.  Subject to the patchy mode of the policy 
initiatives, no explicit and intended social construction of the poor was identified 
in Policy 1.0.  The underlying and subtle construction accompanied with the 
policy did not trigger strong stereotyping of the poor people, and thereby having 
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not invoked their strong participation in certain government responses. 
 
 
Pre-Policy 2.0: Policymaking Dynamics 
 
In the course of evolution of Policy 1.0 to 2.0, the Government was the only 
dominant player in the policymaking dynamics.  There were limited direct 
interactions between the government and the poor in the government’s policy 
formulation and implementation.  It is argued that this is the symbolic effect of 
the policy designs that effectively suppress the initiative of the recipients to 
engage in the policy arena for meaningful discussion, bargaining and negotiation.  
The policy evolution can be view as a self-initiated response by the government to 
the external environment. 
 
Multiple factors are observed that triggered the formulation of Policy 2.0 – 
namely, the distribution of public assistance in cash.  The turbulent political 
situation and social unrest, the economic growth, and the need for the 
Government to cater for the poorest people in the society, were all factors leading 
to the policy change.  Among these factors, the 1967 riot was the driving force 
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behind the policy change.  It caused the Government to carefully evaluate the 
social and economic situation, and reflect on how to make Hong Kong a peaceful 
and stable colony which was beneficial to economic development.  The 
Government’s conclusion was to strengthen its welfare policy, and take concrete 
action to tackle the poverty problem, instead of leaving the job to charitable 
organisations.  The result was the distribution of public assistance in cash to 
needy families – a major step taken by the Government to cater for the poor.   
 
 
Policy 2.0: Major Contents 
 
After the 1967 riot, public assistance in cash was introduced.  The assistance was 
based on a family means test, and unemployed citizens between the age of 15 and 
55 were not qualified to receive the assistance (Chan, 2011).  The assistance was 
provided using family as a unit, because family was an important element in 
society and in Chinese tradition (Lee and Edwards, 1998).  The assistance 
provided was very limited, and owing to the strict means-tested criteria, the 
number of people receiving the assistance was very limited.  In addition to 
controlling the public expenditure, the distribution of public assistance to citizens 
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with a job showed that the Government did not intend to assist unemployed 
people – sending a message to the public that they were expected to work and 
earn an income, instead of relying solely on the Government. 
 
In addition to the CSSA, the Disability and Infirmity Allowance Scheme, later 
known as the Special Needs Allowance Scheme, was introduced in 1973, making 
up of four components: an old age allowance, a higher old age allowance, a 
disability allowance, and a higher disability allowance (Chan, 2011, p.122).  
While this allowance scheme showed that the Government was improving its 
social welfare policies, and was a step towards taking care of the less advantaged 
group in the society, including poor elderly, it was not a policy aiming directly at 
assisting the poor.  For the purpose of discussing Policy 2.0, the focus would 
remain on the public assistance distributed in cash. 
 
With the introduction of the public assistance, it brought about changes in and 
influences to the governance arrangement, construction of the target population, 
and culture and institution. 
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Governance Arrangement of Policy 2.0 
 
Given the rapid economic development, the dramatically increased public revenue 
allowed to government to adopt the more proactive approach to govern.  In the 
1970s under the lead of MacLehose, he took the lead to expand the government 
and enhance its capacity in order to provide more public services in order to meet 
the needs and expectation of the community (McKinsey Report, 1972).  Instead 
of maintaining Private Self-governance only, the distribution of public assistance 
showed that the Government also applied Interventionist Governance.  Still, it 
should be emphasised that the intervention was limited – the Government only 
intervened when necessary, as the colonial government embraced an open and 
free economy – an economy policy which was known as positive 
non-interventionism.  The same idea applied to welfare policy as well – instead 
of implementing a comprehensive welfare policy, the distribution of public 
assistance was minimal assistance to the poor.  Nevertheless, it was a clear 
attempt of the Government tackling the poverty problem, instead of leaving the 
issue at the sole hands of social welfare organisations.  It meant that the social 
welfare organisations and the Government would play a role in tackling poverty, 
but they were not cooperating together to solve the problem.  It was a 
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combination of Private self-governance and Interventionist. 
 
Target Populations under Policy 2.0 
 
The Government clearly defined and restricted the group of people deserving 
public assistance.  The intention of the Government distributing the public 
assistance could be learnt from the 1979 Government Publication, “White Paper – 
Social Welfare in the 1980s” – social welfare provided economic assistance to 
those could not help themselves, and recipients of the assistance should be mainly 
composed of people with low income, the elderly, ill and disabled people 
requiring assistance (Wong, 2001).  This showed how the Government identified 
and constructed a particular group of people that should receive the public 
assistance.  People who fit into the above categories were initially considered 
disadvantaged groups in the society, and with the development of the economy, it 
was the responsibility of the society to provide help.  These groups were labeled 
as “deserving” to receive the assistance from the Government – in contrast to 
healthy adults at the working age, who were supposed to go to work and earn a 
living, instead of relying on the public assistance.  The groups which were 
considered to be having low political power gained more power after the 1967 riot, 
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making it necessary for the Government to cater for their needs. 
 
SCT states that policy designs have both material and interpretative effects.  The 
Government had to limit the group of people receiving the public assistance in 
cash, and the intended group of people receiving the public assistance could be 
identified from the aforementioned 1979 Government Paper.  People receiving 
the assistance were considered to be the needy – people who were unable to help 
themselves, thus requiring assistance from the society.  This construction showed 
that the Government defined particular categories of people as the “needy”, and 
the public assistance was not intended for everyone in the society.  For instance, 
if a person is able to take care of himself by earning an income, then he should not 
be applying for the public assistance.  The same applies to people who only used 
to be needy – once a person no longer needs the assistance and can earn his own 
income to sustain life, he should refrain from receiving further public assistance.  
This essentially sent a message to the society that the public assistance was only 
intended to be a safety net for a limited number of people, and people should not 
expect to receive the benefits if they had the ability to make a living. 
 
The difference between distributing only basic supplies and distributing cash is 
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huge – in terms of material effects, it consumed government’s monetary resources 
to construct a social safety net, at the expense of taxpayers.  In terms of the 
interpretative effects, the Government also wanted to make it clear that the public 
assistance was not for healthy adults at the working age – it was only meant for 
the needy, people who could not help themselves to earn the income to sustain life.  
In addition, owing to the low levels of public assistance distributed, the poor 
receiving the assistance were often stigmatised (Chan, 2011).  This was a 
message to the public that it was undesirable for one to receive public assistance 
from the Government, as it was not possible for a person to rely solely on the 
assistance to meet the most basic standard of living (Chow, 2014). 
 
Culture and Institution of Policy 2.0 
 
Social construction of target groups can be changed, but the change is difficult to 
induce.  With the Government limiting the groups of people requiring public 
assistance, the Government constructed an image of the poor.  The society 
formed an impression that it was not very desirable for one to receive public 
assistance, as the assistance was only dedicated to people in need.  The 
construction of this undesirable image lingered on, even up to the present day, 
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with Government officials openly admitting in 1998 that CSSA took care of lazy 
people.  It showed that when a social construction is formed, it is very difficult to 
change the construction. 
 
For people receiving public assistance, the Social Welfare Department would 
arrange home visits, as a way to determine the needs of the poor families and to 
ensure that public resources were not abused.  The government employees, who 
were not professional social workers, would suspect recipients of the public 
assistance as taking advantage of the scheme (Chan, 2011).  Given that 
recipients of public assistance had to be means-tested on a family basis, and the 
home visits served as an embarrassment for people receiving the assistance, a 
negative image was already formed in the early stages of distributing public 
assistance.  In the Chinese culture, “face” is very important.  For people 
receiving the public assistance, “poor was already a cause for shame” (Chan, 2011, 
p.126); being questioned by the officials on the families’ economic condition 
during the home visits only served to make the shame even more unbearable, as 
the recipients would feel they were losing face.  Therefore, there was a general 
impression among the citizens – no matter they were recipients of public 
assistance or not – that receiving the public assistance was not desirable, and 
 65 
recipients should find a way to make a living and stop receiving taxpayers’ money 
when they can. 
 
 
Policy 2.0: Policy Tool Analysis 
 
In 1971, the Government began to distribute public assistance (later renamed 
Comprehensive Social Security Assistance (CSSA) in 1993) in the form of cash.  
This marked a significant change in the Government’s policy, as the allowance 
was direct assistance to the poor.  The allowance can be regarded as a kind of 
inducement tool (Elmore, 1987) with a view to attain the goal for short-term 
alleviation of the poor’s adverse conditions.  The adoption of the instruments can 
be attributed that the Government was aware that mandates and sticks could be 
used to maintain the social order, as was the case in 1956 and 1967 when the 
Government used forces to quell the riots; however, the Government moved 
towards less confrontational measures in order to gain the support of citizens, 
which was an important tactic to mend the wounds of riot suppression and ensure 
that the colonial government could maintain firm control of the city. 
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Policy 2.0 to 3.0 
 
Policy 2.0 was mainly characterised as the provision of CSSA.  Other measures, 
such as public housing and compulsory education, which aimed at serving many 
other social purposes, were the poverty alleviating measures of Hong Kong from 
1971 – 1997.  There was not another major policy change up to the return of 
sovereignty to China, with only gradual improvements to existing policies.  
However, in these 26 years, the steadiness of the policy gradually collided with 
the increasing social awareness on poverty handling.  People perceived poverty 
as a social problem which required better policies to solve.  Basically, the rapid 
changing macro socio-political conditions, economic frustration, change of 
demographic structure, etc., once again, served as the driving forces that paved 
the way to Policy 3.0.   
 
With the rapid economic and social development of Hong Kong, some became 
more affluent, gradually leading to the emergence of a middle-class population – 
as evidenced by Hong Kong’s GDP breaking the US$10,000 mark in 1988.  
More people could afford entertainment, better educational and recreational 
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opportunities, and even luxury goods.  However, the economic development did 
not benefit everyone.  With the economic revolution of Communist China, a lot 
of factories relocated to the mainland to save costs, causing the demise of the 
once-prosperous local manufacturing industry.  A significant amount of 
low-skilled manufacturing jobs were lost, hence the other industries were flooded 
with low-skilled workers.  The low-income jobs took a hit, and the wages 
became even lower.  This did not bold well for the less affluent population in the 
society.  The widening of rich-poor gap could be felt by the less advantaged 
group.  
 
Not only did the poverty problem become more apparent to the general public, but 
it also received a wider recognition in academic researches.  For instance, the 
1997 Caritas research report quoted 8 researches on poverty – such researches 
were more sporadic in the 1970s and 1980s, and were also less accessible owing 
to less channels of information distribution.  
 
It should be noted that the Government did attempt to revamp the CSSA in the 
1990s.  The CSSA was criticised for lacking behind the living standard of Hong 
Kong people, as evidenced by the recipients spending 60-70% of the CSSA on 
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purchasing food, the most important expense to ensure survival.  After growing 
social pressure and hearing from scholars that recipients of CSSA could not 
maintain acceptable living standard in the early 1990s, the Government tried to 
determine the level of CSSA using a new calculation standard, by taking into 
account the “basic needs” and “family consumption style” (Wong, 2001).  This 
led to an increase in the level of CSSA in 1996, but this adjustment was quickly 
rescinded in 1998 when the Government cut costs in face of the economic crisis.  
 
The increasing Gini coefficient was an objective indicator that the rich-poor gap 
was widening.  In the era of 1971 - 1997, it can be observed that the poor were 
becoming more and more dissatisfied with the economic situation, as they 
gradually came to realise that they could not benefit from the substantial 
economic development in the 1970s and 1980s.  With the poverty problem 
gaining more exposure in the media, and with more and more people receiving 
CSSA, the society also became more aware of the problem.  This set the scene 
for the policy change that was to come after the handover. 
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Concluding Comments  
 
To conclude, 1971 marks the most significant change of poverty alleviation policy 
in the colonial era – the start of distribution of public assistance in cash, in 
response to the riot in 1967.  Instead of maintaining Private self-governance, as 
was the case in 1950s and 1960s, the Government took up the responsibility of 
taking care of the poorest and most disadvantaged families in the society, 
governing using a combination of Private self-governance and Interventionist 
governance. 
 
When the monetary assistance was first distributed to a selected few of 
means-tested families, it was far from sufficient to sustain life, but it was a 
remarkable change in the Government’s social welfare policy.  It marked the 
beginning of concrete poverty alleviation policies, and the use of public 
expenditure to assist the poor.  The expenditure on the public assistance 
continued to grow, gradually taking up a larger and larger chunk in the public 
expenditure, and became a recurrent expense item of the Government. 
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What is more important in the pre-handover period is that the social construction 
of the poor was formed with the public assistance.  Before 1971, people were 
generally poor, and there was no explicit or official labeling of poor people.  
However, since 1971, with the introduction of public assistance in cash, people 
receiving the public assistance were labeled as the “needy” group in the society – 
a label that carries negative connotations even up to the present day, as the public 
assistance was not meant to allow a person to maintain a good standard of living, 
but was only meant as a last resort.  Despite the labeling, the monetary public 
assistance, later renamed CSSA in 1993, became the centrepiece in the 
Government’s poverty alleviation policies, even after the handover of Hong 
Kong’s sovereignty back to China. 
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CHAPTER 4  POST-HANDOVER: 1997 – 2012 
 
Overview of Policy 3.0 Formulation: Commission on Poverty (1st CoP) 
 
First and foremost, it is important to note that all events presented in the 
preceding chapter and the present chapter is a continuum.  This chapter will 
analyse the establishment of Commission on Poverty in 2005 as Policy 3.0, using 
the refined analytical model adopted in this project.  Thus, in the first part of this 
chapter, the contents before the appearance of Policy 3.0 would be introduced.  A 
number of sections will be included to describe how Policy 2.0 was transformed 
to Policy 3.0 (it may be regarded as the period of Pre-Policy 3.0; the reason why 
the Policy 2.x was not used was because it is argued that Policy 3.0 is another 
drastic leap forward rather than a gradual evolution).  Based on the refined 
model, the sequence of analysis would be first to discuss the changing macro 
social context and governance arrangement (with institutional settings), followed 
by evolving social construction of the target populations of the pre-Policy 3.0 
period.  Then, the events in the policymaking dynamics that led to the eventual 
formulation of Policy 3.0 would be illustrated.  However, since the government 
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was still the sole dominating agent in the dynamics, only trivial interaction was 
observed.  After that, the content of Policy 3.0 would be described.  Lastly, as a 
continuum of policy development, Policy 3.0 will be briefly discussed, again 
paving the way for Policy 4.0 as an evolving process. 
 
As a quick recap, the preceding chapter argued that the formulation of Policy 2.0 
was to respond to the social unrest in the 1960s that threatened the legitimacy and 
governance of the British colonial government.  Given that the social 
construction at the previous stage did not arouse drastic political participation of 
target recipients, the contents of Policy 2.0 remained steady for nearly 30 years.  
However, as time went by, the social circumstances, demographic structures, 
economic landscapes underwent tremendous changes, the policy which was once 
effective could no longer meet the needs under the vibrant socio-political 
environment immediately preceding and after the handover.  
 
One of the insights of SCT is that the degenerative form of policy usually 
maintains even when people’s welfare is dampened by it (Schneider and Ingram, 
1997).  In fact, there was a long and miserable process for Policy 2.0 to be 
evolved to Policy 3.0 (i.e. the Pre-Policy 3.0 period).  In this section, Policy 3.0 
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was labelled as the setting up of the  Poverty (in order to distinguish it from the 
recent Commission on Poverty reinstated in 2012, hereinafter the Commission 
formed in 2005 is referred to as the “1st CoP”).  Policy 3.0 was marked as the 
turning point of government policy from a passive, retaining style towards a 
proactive and comprehensive approach in handling poverty problems.  
Compared with Policy 2.0, which was characterised as issuing cash allowance to 
the poorest population, Policy 3.0 was a milestone because since then the 
Government would proactively seek the origins of the problem and then introduce 
measures to address them.  It was another major leap of policy development 
since the 1970s.  
 
Policy 3.0 also possessed other significant impacts.  Firstly, it was the first time 
which the Government officially admitted poverty was a serious social problem 
(Wong, 2015, p.349); secondly, the Government inclined to agree that poverty 
was due to certain structural weaknesses rather than merely temporary conditions 
caused by periodical economic fluctuations (HKSAR Government, 2000, 
paragraph 83); thirdly, the identification of such structural weaknesses was 
important as it helped the Government to have comprehensive poverty alleviation 
planning; and lastly, an integrated approach including collaboration of various 
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sectors should be used to handle the problem at different dimensions, i.e., the 
formulation of a target-oriented, well-designed and sophisticated policy was 
implied. 
 
 
Pre-Policy 3.0: Socio-political Background (1997 – 2005) 
 
In gist, the social background of Pre-Policy 3.0 could be summarised into the 
following factors: highly uneven distribution of wealth; widening gap between the 
rich and the poor; the stunt of the social upward ladder (Goodstadt, 2013); and the 
community was battered by a series of economic downturn but the government 
failed to produce appropriate policies to tackle the adverse situations of the 
people. 
 
Right after the handover in 1997, Hong Kong was strongly impacted by the Asian 
Financial Crisis, leading to the decline of asset prices by about 44% between 
October 1997 and December 1998 (Information Services Department, 1998), and 
shrinking of stock market with the average daily turnover in the local stock 
market plunging from $15.5 billion in 1997 to $6.9 billion in 1998 (Information 
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Services Department, 1998).  The Composite Consumer Price Index also 
dropped since November 1998 and the drop percentage reached 6.1% in August 
1999 (Census and Statistics Department, 2002).  The financial crisis forced 
Hong Kong to experience a lingering, vigorous and miserable economic 
reconstruction.  The resulting force of the reconstruction led to numerous 
companies going bankrupt, accompanied by a large number of people being laid 
off from their jobs.  Thus, the unemployment rate soared from 4.7% in 1998 to 
6.3% in 1999, compared with 2.2% in 1997 before the handover (Census and 
Statistics Department, 2000).  The recovery in 2000 was just a short term 
upward trend during a prolonged downward slope of the economy.  The 
economy deteriorated again in 2001 owing to the Dot-com Bubble burst in the 
information technology industry. 
 
The poor global economic conditions caused serious damage to the Hong Kong 
economy.  Worse still, the outbreak of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 
(SARS) in early 2003, which killed 299 people (Department of Health, 2006), 
became another dose of poison to the Hong Kong economy.  The economic 
recession caused social unrest, invoking needy people to request for assistance 
from the government.  Under such circumstances, the CSSA alone could no 
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longer cater for the social demands.  People expected the Government to 
introduce policies that can cure the root causes of poverty.  Unfortunately, a 
comprehensive poverty policy was exactly the missing ring of the government 
policy.  There was a tradition that the Government made no attempt to admit the 
existence of poverty problem, let alone giving it an official definition or assessing 
its severity.  As mentioned before, the Government only adopted the haphazard 
approach to address the problem, lacking the vision to solve the problem in the 
long run.   
 
It was only until in 2000 which the former Chief Executive TUNG Chee-hwa 
(“CE TUNG”) admitted there was poverty in Hong Kong, and therefore requiring 
comprehensive strategies to deal with the issue.  In his Policy Address in 2000, 
he reserved 16 paragraphs introducing the vision and initiatives of the HKSAR 
Government that would be adopted to alleviate poverty.  In paragraph 84 CE 
TUNG stated that: 
 
“Over the past few months, many concern groups have put forward their 
ideas on helping the poor.  I share the views expressed by many members 
of the community that the problem should be tackled by holistic and 
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integrated social and economic policies.”  
(Paragraph 84 of Policy Address 2000, in HKSAR Government, 2000).  
 
Though CE TUNG demonstrated his determination in poverty alleviation in such 
a high profile manner, the policy initiatives did not jump out of the box, and the 
so-called new ideas were still the conventional ways which the Government had 
been applying to handle social issues in the past, such as training and job creation.  
The Government produced no new measures in view of the emerging needs of 
poverty alleviation, but there was keen expectation from the public that urged for 
a novel and more effective poverty policy.  The tensions remained until the 
tipping point – the massive protest on 1st July 2003 – induced a new round of the 
(poverty) policy evolution: Policy 3.0 – the establishment of the Commission on 
Poverty (1st CoP). 
 
 
Pre-Policy 3.0: Governance Arrangement 
 
The governance arrangement after the handover was mainly a combined form of 
Interventionist governance and Regulated self-governance approach.  In term of 
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legal obligation, the Government has the authority and capacity to set and enforce 
rules under the executive-led governance arrangement (Burns, 2005).  From the 
perspective of public-private cooperation, the Government played a dominant role 
in their collaboration since most of the social programmes were directly funded or 
subsidised by the Government.  The Government always had the final veto 
power, and those sponsored organisations may be regarded as an executive arm or 
agents of the Government.  Moreover, the implementation of the Principal 
Officials Accountability System (POAS) in July 2002 only led to further 
concentration of policy making power at the hands of the Government (Scott, 
2010). 
 
 
Pre-Policy 3.0: Evolving Social Culture 
 
Policy 2.0 was the product in the 1970s.  Its creation was to resolve certain 
social problems at the material time and the measure was proven to be reasonably 
effective.  Initially, the measure (a mean-tested scheme) was to provide a safety 
net to the needy in the form of cash allowance.  The intention was relatively 
simple and pure.  Government officials seldom openly commented or criticised 
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the policy recipients, and they did not take much action to further tighten the 
CSSA issuing mechanism since it was first launched.  The implementation of the 
policy gradually reached equilibrium, as it did not trigger strong social concerns 
or reactions from the target populations.   
 
The balance was broken until CSSA underwent a comprehensive review in 1998.  
During this review exercise, the Government made its stance very clear: firstly, 
there was a huge increase in CSSA expenditure, which rose from $860 million in 
1994/95 to $2,640 million in 1997/98 (Social Welfare Department, 1998), casting 
a heavy burden on the public finance.  Secondly, as stated in paragraph 9 of 
Report on Review of the Comprehensive Social Security Assistance Scheme, 
“There is also an increasing perception that some people are abusing the system” 
(Social Welfare Department, 1998), thus the Government proposed to have tighter 
monitoring.  Thirdly, to solve the above problems, the Government encouraged 
the CSSA recipients to join the workforce and promoted self-reliance.  In 
paragraph 32 of the same document, the Government intended to deliver the 
message: “ ‘Any job is better than no job’, ‘Low pay is better than no pay’, and 
‘CSSA is a safety net and a last resort’ ” (Social Welfare Department, 1998).  All 
these three messages pointed to the theme of the CSSA review report: support for 
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self-reliance.  The Government strongly advocated that the CSSA recipients 
should be “self-reliant” as it worried about the spread of a dependency culture in 
the community.   
 
Mr. Andrew LEUNG Kin-pong (Mr. LEUNG), the Director of Social Welfare at 
that time once mentioned in a radio interview that, “In order to be qualified to 
receive CSSA, some capable people gave up their jobs.  In this regard, Social 
Welfare Department had to lower the assistance rates and encouraged the 
unemployed to seek jobs.” (Tin Tin Daily News, 10 November 1998).  The 
impact of the discussion on CSSA was huge and extensive.  Mr. LEUNG 
stressed on the CSSA fraud cases (Hong Kong Standard, 2 August 1998) and the 
local press put “CSSA makes people lazy” as the headlines (Wong, 2000).   
 
The comments of Mr. LEUNG reflected the view and preference of the 
Government.  The speech also served as an information tool which conveyed the 
message that (i) the present situation was no longer tolerable, (ii) the Government 
would take action to change, or rectify, the situation.  Another symbolic effect of 
the policy was that the Government began to openly stigmatise the target 
populations – CSSA recipients – with attributes such as incapable, lazy and 
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cheating.  And the actual effect was to suppress and discourage people, even the 
genuine needy ones, from applying CSSA (Wong, 2015).  The shift of policy 
successfully aroused the concern of public who were not receiving CSSA, and 
even led to some of the public’s hostile attitude towards the CSSA recipients.  
Since then the public became less sympathetic towards the CSSA recipients. 
 
 
Pre-Policy 3.0: Evolving Target Population 
 
SCT proposes that policy contents contain both material and symbolic effects that 
shape the social construction and political participation of the target populations 
(Schneider, Ingram and DeLeon, 2014).  The contents of CSSA review 
(Pre-Policy 3.0) consisted of the following designs: firstly, the issuing of cash (an 
inducement) as the original scheme did; secondly, it was the senior government 
official’s comments and the new assessment mechanism serving as an information 
tool to reshape the image of target recipients.   
 
In terms of the material effect, the amount of cash delivered from the scheme was 
largely constrained by the economic situations and financial stance of the 
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Government.  The amount of cash was not adjusted for a number of years owing 
to rising price level of the commodities.  The allowance could only barely cover 
the daily expenses.  Recipients had to tighten their belts in order to pay the bills 
for necessities, such as rent and transport expenses.  As a result, the material 
effect of non-adjusted CSSA, as the main body of poverty alleviating measure, 
could only allow the recipients to maintain their basic livelihood.   
 
For the interpretative effects, though the poor and unemployed were still 
described as dependents, many negative attributes were also attached to them by 
the Government and the society.  Under the strong advocacy of “self-reliance”, 
the public considered though the poor deserved help, the assistance should be 
imposed with more stringent conditions.  Subject to the negative portrayal of the 
target recipients under the revised policy, the community generally became more 
indifferent, skeptical and even hostile towards CSSA recipients.   
 
The combined effects of the revised policy shifted the social construction of the 
CSSA recipients significantly.  First, it strengthened the feeling of shame of 
CSSA recipients towards getting assistance from the Government; second, it 
dampened their self-esteem and confidence, thereby suppressing the willingness 
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of some needy to apply for CSSA (Wong, 2015).  Third, the policy induced the 
CSSA recipients’ anger and opposition towards the Government as they found 
themselves being alienated by the Government and marginalised by the society 
while their living standard was not improved.  What made the situation even 
worse was that their weak political power and poor organisation caused their 
continuing desperate situation to be even more unbearable. 
 
 
Pre-Policy 3.0: Policymaking Dynamics 
 
As mentioned before, policymaking dynamics can be regarded as the platform 
where the interaction among stakeholders of the policy happens, including the 
expression of political rhetoric, bargaining and negotiation.  The result of such 
interaction would become the new version of policy.  However, since the target 
populations (CSSA recipients) were politically weak and they were 
under-represented, it is argued that the Government was the sole major player in 
the dynamics.  In a nutshell, Policy 3.0 was not the output of bargaining and 
negotiation with its counterparts in the policymaking dynamics.  Instead, it was 
the Government’s response to the changed external environment after concluding 
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the failures and pitfalls of the administration in the first few years after the 
handover (HKSAR Government, 2005, paragraphs 14 – 16).  In assessing the 
shortcomings in the past, the Government came to following conclusions: 
 
Firstly, the Government opined that the economic recession, though not the sole 
reason, was the major cause of poverty and people’s hardship.  The Government 
reckoned that the poverty would become a less pressing issue when the economy 
recovered (HKSAR Government, 2005, paragraph 35).  In order to restore the 
momentum of the economy, the Government should keep investing in human 
capital, i.e., life-long learning and continuous training.  Through training and 
skills enhancement, more layoff labour may join the work force again, and in turn 
reducing the number people who needed to rely on social security.   
 
Secondly, in face of financial instability and budget deficits, the priority to 
conform to prudent financial management overwhelmed other governance 
objectives, i.e. poverty alleviation.  Thus, any policies crafted for poverty 
alleviation must adhere to this principle.  Hence, the option for a sharp increase 
in welfare expenditure was basically ruled out.  However, since the demand on 
social welfare kept on increasing, in 1998, the number of CSSA cases was 
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227,454, and it gradually increased to 298,011 in 2005 (Census and Statistics 
Department, 2009), it imposed a huge burden on the public finance.  From the 
perception of the policymakers, the tendency for increasing the welfare 
expenditure should be controlled. 
 
Thirdly, poverty was a complicated problem which required multi-pronged 
solutions.  Poverty may be a symptom with numerous root causes.  One of the 
prominent allegations for poverty was that the opportunity for upward social 
movement had disappeared (Goodstadt, 2013).  Poor people would only be able 
to maintain their status quo at best, if not facing deteriorating living standards in 
term of their financial situation.  This situation also leads to inter-generational 
poverty.  Subject to the severity of the problem, the Government admitted that 
the provision of cash allowance alone was not an effective measure to cure 
poverty but other peripheral measures were required to tackle the root causes. 
 
Fourthly, the bureaucracy had its limitations and it might not be the best 
arrangement for a single department to tackle the poverty problem.  From the 
execution perspective, bureaucracy faced a lot of constraints which may prohibit 
the efficient and timely implementation of policies, and the situation may become 
 86 
more obvious when implementation involved collaboration among different 
government departments.  Worse still, heuristics adopted by bureaucrats usually 
hindered innovative solutions from being generated.  As such, an independent 
agent external to the bureaucratic structure, but equipped with the power, filled 
with expertise, may be a better choice. 
 
Fifthly, following the work of CSSA review in 1998, the concept of “self-reliance” 
should serve as the guiding principle for crafting any poverty alleviating measures.  
The measures designed should be focused on creating the incentive to encourage 
people to join the workforce.   
 
Lastly, a meaningful collaboration with partners was critical for problem-solving.  
From the Government’s perspective, a new institution (an “organisation” or 
“system-changing” tool) which aims at developing the comprehensive poverty 
alleviation measures, not only inter-governmental, but also involving different 
sectors in the society, would be a feasible option.  Under the new institutional 
framework, the Government can make good use of the readily available resources, 
and also share the responsibility among the society, such as with NGOs and the 
private sector. 
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Based on the above rationale, the Government came up with the proposal of 
forming the Commission on Poverty (1st CoP) in 2005 which would coordinate 
the efforts of various stakeholders to explore the possible solutions for poverty 
alleviation. 
 
 
Policy 3.0: Major Contents 
 
The Government gave an account of the 1st CoP.  In Policy Address 2005, CE 
TUNG stated that: 
 
“Dealing with poverty in a restructuring economy involves many policy 
areas.  I have therefore decided to establish a commission to alleviate 
poverty, which will be chaired by the Financial Secretary and comprise 
Government officials, Legislative Councillors, business people, 
non-government organisations, experts and academics.  Its task will be to 
study, from a macro perspective, how to help the poor in terms of financial, 
employment, education and training needs.  It will also explore practical 
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ways to assist those who suffer from poverty due to old age, disability or 
single-parent family, particularly those in low-income employment” 
(Paragraph 44 of Policy Address 2005, in HKSAR Government, 2005). 
 
The above statement summarised the purpose, format, members’ composition, 
duties and target population of Policy 3.0. 
 
The 1st CoP was the first official body that was established to look into the 
poverty problem in Hong Kong, collecting data and conducting analysis on this 
specific topic.  According to “Report of the Commission on Poverty”, its three 
major duties were to (i) Enhancing understanding of Poverty; (ii) Making 
immediate improvements; and (iii) Identifying direction for future work. 
(Commission on Poverty, 2007). 
 
Financial Secretary Mr. Henry TANG Ying-yen was appointed as the chairman of 
the 1st CoP.  The status of such a top government official (Financial Secretary) 
equipped the 1st CoP with authority and credibility, allowing the 1st CoP to have 
adequate power to steer the multi-disciplinary cooperation among government 
departments and to initiate collaboration with the community.  For example, the 
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1st CoP collaborated with the Hong Kong Council of Social Service and some 
tertiary institutions to provide training course on social entrepreneurship 
(Commission on Poverty, 2007).  This in turn empowered the social enterprise 
and created job opportunity. 
 
For the institutional aspect, Policy 3.0 was established in the form of commission 
rather than under the existing government departments.  This made the 1st CoP 
work with higher flexibility, both administratively and financially.  This setting 
also allowed the Commission to act quickly in response to the pressing social 
needs. 
 
To prevent the public from criticising the abuse of public resources, the 
Government stated clearly at the outset that the 1st CoP targeted at helping senior 
citizens, people with disability or single-parent families, especially those 
low-income families.  These target populations possessed positive images and 
were widely agreed that they deserved help.  CE TUNG highlighted the 
low-income family, reinforcing the principle of “self-reliance” behind Policy 3.0. 
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Policy 3.0: Policy Tool Analysis 
 
The 1st CoP was a kind of “organisation” or “system changing” tool but served to 
provide functions as the tools of “economic/ inducement” and “information”.  
Firstly, the 1st CoP was an institution delegated with authority and assigned with 
missions.  The institution was set up in the form of an independent commission 
rather than modifying the existing government structure to accommodate the 
changes.  As an executive arm, it steered the implementation of other policy 
tools.  It recommended poverty alleviation measures for other government 
departments, public and private organisations, and other agents in the civil 
society.   
 
To serve as the economic tool, the 1st CoP recommended to the Government that it 
should offer “inducements” with a view to promoting self-reliance, for example 
advocating training programmes, thus building people’s capacity to join the 
labour market.   
 
To serve the purpose of an information tool, the 1st CoP performed data collection 
and analysis in relation to the poverty situation of Hong Kong.  The information 
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and insight would be produced for the Government to formulate strategies for 
poverty alleviation.  More importantly, the 1st CoP tried to put forward two clear 
messages to the public that (i) the Government would no longer adopt a 
wait-and-see attitude towards poverty but more proactive drastic measures will be 
produced, and (ii) the Commission would offer solutions based on the 
“self-reliance” principle, thus the “welfare state” approach adopted in the West 
was not an option. 
 
 
Policy 3.0 to 4.0 (2005 – 2012) 
 
The 1st CoP operated for 2.5 years, and then the succeeding Chief Executive, Mr. 
Donald TSANG Yam-kuen (“CE TSANG”) chose not to continue the CoP in his 
term.  Although the 1st CoP was relatively short compared to the implementation 
of long term government policy, Policy 3.0 opened a new opportunity to introduce 
various policy instruments in poverty alleviation, from merely monetary to a 
system changing, economic and information tool.  It also recommended that the 
Government could reallocate the readily available resources among the 
government departments and deploy them more efficiently. 
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In addition, the 1st CoP officially collected and analysed the information on 
poverty in Hong Kong, which served as a valuable resource and foundation to the 
evolution and planning of the new policy tool on poverty alleviation afterwards. 
 
During CE TSANG’s administration period (21 June 2005 – 30 June 2012), 
though the economy started to recover, the gap between the rich and the poor 
became even wider. The Gini Coefficient (Original Household Income) in 2006 
was 0.533 and it rose to 0.537 in 2011 (Census and Statistics Department, 2012), 
showing a trend that the poor could not enjoy the fruits of economic growth.  
Worse still, inflation followed the recovery, and the rising price level implied that 
the poor faced even more hardship.   
 
During this transition period, a number of policies were introduced in different 
bureaux, e.g. Health Care Voucher by the Food and Health Bureau, Community 
Care Fund by the Home Affairs Bureau, Statutory Minimum Wage and Work 
Incentive Transport Subsidy Scheme handled by the Labour and Welfare Bureau.  
Though they had extensive coverage, they still could not meet the rapid rising 
expectations of the public.  
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Moreover, presumably it was inspired by other social movements happened 
during that period, the target populations became more proactive and tactful in 
organising themselves to bargain with the Government.  The resultant force led 
to the formulation of a target-oriented, sophisticated policy, i.e. re-establishment 
of the Commission on Poverty (2nd CoP), the Poverty Line, Old Age Living 
Allowance (OALA), Low-Income Working Family Allowance (LIFA), etc., which 
were found in Policy 4.0 period. 
 
 
Concluding Comments 
 
Policy 3.0 was a product under vibrant environment, the fermentation process was 
painful: Asian Financial Crisis, economic reconstruction, high unemployment rate, 
SARS, the massive protest on 1 July 2003.  Such adverse condition acted as a 
catalyst that provoked the birth of a new policy tool, the 1st CoP. 
 
Policy 3.0 marked an important breakthrough of the Government’s attitude in 
handling poverty.  It officially admitted there was poverty in Hong Kong, only 
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with this could the Government start to plan for the comprehensive strategies in 
poverty alleviation.  Although the 1st CoP only survived for 2.5 years, it 
contributed a lot in the feed-forward process of SCT: (i) the social construction of 
the target population was changed from “deserving but with negative attributes” 
to “deserving”; (ii) the policy design was enriched with more diversity in the 
nature of policy tool, from CSSA being merely an “inducement tool” to the 1st 
CoP which was an “organisation/system changing”, “economic/inducement” and 
“information” policy tool.  This provided a rich breeding ground for the next 
policy tool to grow on; (iii) a new institution design was introduced to poverty 
alleviation using the format of Commission.  This opened a new opportunity for 
a government-led body to work with higher flexibility and also facilitated the 
collaboration with other stakeholders in the society.  This move allowed the 
Government to share the burden, as well as giving the stakeholders a sense of 
responsibility, encouraging them to participate more actively in poverty 
alleviation activities; (iv) the culture of “self-reliance” was further strengthened 
through specifying the target population of the 1st CoP, especially the low-income 
group was highlighted.  
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It was anticipated that the above changes would continue in a new government.  
As one could observe that after the 1st CoP was not continued, the new measures 
launched by CE TSANG followed a similar trend.  For example, the Statutory 
Minimum Wage and Work Incentive Transport Subsidy Scheme encouraged 
self-reliance; the Health Care Voucher encouraged the collaboration between 
public healthcare sector and the private one.  Besides, as Hong Kong’s civil 
society was growing, it was anticipated that the target population would gain more 
political power and more policy dynamics could be observed in the next phase. 
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CHAPTER 5  POST-HANDOVER: 2012 – Present 
 
Overview of Policy 4.0 Formulation: Commission on Poverty (2nd CoP) & 
Poverty Line 
 
Based again on the refined model developed in Chapter 2 that composes building 
blocks of both macro factors and micro attributes, this Chapter 5 will analyse how 
Policy 3.0 evolved into Policy 4.0.  To systematically describe how the evolution 
took place, again, the macro socio-political setting and governance arrangement 
are to firstly be disposed.  This is followed by the illustration of the culture and 
institution (with an analysis of the effects of Policy 3.X).  Then, this chapter will 
explore how the general social environment, political institution, and the 
(proactive) Policy 3.5 re-shaped the social construction of the target populations, 
and the policymaking dynamics that led to Policy 4.0.  Lastly, the content of 
Policy 4.0 will be analysed under the policy tool approach. 
 
The evolution process was characterised by three observations.  First, various 
poverty alleviation measures were introduced during this transition period (after 
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the dismissal of the first Commission on Poverty), which was known as Policy 3.5.  
These instruments were of different varieties of nature and functions.  Second, 
the process of evolution became rapid.  Unlike the previous stages that required a 
few decades for the policy change to complete, it took only a few years for Policy 
3.0 to evolve into Policy 4.0.  And the scale and intensity of change exceeded 
those of the previous generations.  Third, more active interaction was observed 
in the policymaking dynamics.  In the previous rounds, the Government was the 
single agent who could determine the outputs in the dynamics.  Other parties 
were either being passive or indifferent to engage in the bargaining and 
negotiation process.  And they seldom tried to deliver any political rhetoric to 
pursue their interests.  On the contrary, during the pre-Policy 4.0 period, 
numerous powerful stakeholders, mainly from the social welfare sectors, 
proactively engaged in the dynamics to bargain with the Government.  As a 
result, some sophisticated and innovative policies were produced.   
 
The setting-up of the first Commission on Poverty was known as 3.0.  Policy 3.5 
(a pre-Policy 4.0 phase) referred to the dismissal of the first Commission on 
Poverty and the introduction of a number of other drastic measures, such as, 
Health Care Voucher for the elderly, Work Incentive Transport Subsidy, minimum 
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wage legislation, etc.  Then, the reinstating of the Commission on Poverty and 
the setting up of the Poverty Line were marked as Policy 4.0.  All these measures 
reflected that the Government was gradually taking a more proactive step to tackle 
the poverty issues and the approach became more and more interventional. 
 
Pre-policy 4.0: Socio-political Background (2007 – 2012) 
 
The Economy 
 
In general, the overall percentage of poor people in Hong Kong, i.e. the 
low-income resident numbers to total population ratio, rose from 11.2% to 17.1% 
in 1991 – 2011 (Wong, 2015).  The poor-rich gap problem deteriorated over the 
course as the Gini Coefficient after a hike in mid-1980s – 1990s from 0.453 to 
0.518 continued to climbed to 0.537 in 2011 (based on original household 
income), as reported by the Financial Secretary’s Office (2012).  The poor kept 
living in adverse conditions and they did not share the fruits of the economic 
recovery and improvement.  This led to growing, massive concerns and 
grievances from the poor, social welfare sectors, and the society at large. 
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Politics 
 
Politics became less stable.  Disputes and conflicts happened inside the 
Government and in the community.  The relationship of the pan-democratic 
political camps became more hostile, suspicious and confrontational with the 
Government and the pro-establishment groups.  New political power emerged.  
For instance, just a few months after CE LEUNG assumed the CE office, the 
Scholarism led the social movement of the anti-Moral and National Education 
campaign, which successfully forced the Government to shelve the policy in 
September 2012.   
 
On 31 August 2014, the National People’s Congress carved their decision on the 
methods for selecting the Chief Executive in 2017, which was seen by many, 
especially the pan-democratic and emerging political radical people, as the Beijing 
central government’s failure to deliver its promise to take forward the democratic 
development in Hong Kong.  This directly brought about the Umbrella 
Movement in September – December 2014, causing further division and 
confrontation among Hong Kong people, disruption to daily life, and a resulting 
society rife with political malaise.  Since then the tension and altercations 
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between them have never dissipated, as evidenced by frequent filibustering in the 
Legislative Council. 
 
Societal 
 
According to the Public Opinion Programme of the University of Hong Kong 
(2016), CE LEUNG’s support ratings plunged from 56.5 in May 2012 after his 
election to 46 in September 2012, and then spiraled down to 38.4 in June 2016.  
This could be attributed to the various scandals whirling around him, as well as to 
the political malaise and confrontation.  And there were breeding discontent and 
mistrust towards CE LEUNG, as well as the government at large. 
 
All of these exogenous factors had direct and substantial effects on the 
government’s poverty alleviation policies, which was seen to be more responsive 
and progressive.  It is argued that was one of the few areas of work that the 
government could do with much political discretion and financial capacity, and 
the government had to make it up to the socio-economically, politically and 
societally frustrated Hong Kong people. 
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Pre-policy 4.0: Governance Arrangement 
 
The governance arrangement basically followed the structure established in Policy 
3.0, i.e. a combination of Interventionist governance and Regulated 
self-governance, but with a greater tendency to be more proactive and dominant in 
the role of policy formulation.  On the one hand the higher priority in the 
government’s administration was induced by the social situations.  On the other 
the change was due to the different governance principles brought by the new 
Chief Executive.  The subtle change in governance was first evidenced by CE 
LEUNG’s election manifesto in 2012 that, “We only need an appropriately 
proactive government which seeks changes whilst maintaining overall stability.” 
(Leung, 2012, p.5), as well as in his first Policy Address 2013 that was titled as 
“Seek Change, Maintain Stability, Serve the People with Pragmatism”.  In 
particular, he in the manifesto vowed to “reinstate the Commission on Poverty to 
undertake an overall review of the forms and manners by which poverty is 
manifested and their underlying causes” in the part of his pledge of social welfare 
(Leung, 2012, p.46).  This was seen as a subtle but important twist in poverty 
alleviation policy.  If former CE TSANG’s promise to put in place poverty 
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alleviation policies addressing the widening rich-poor gap was merely a slogan, 
then CE LEUNG made such policies one of the main planks of his governance. 
 
Effects of Policy 3.X 
 
In the previous poverty alleviation Policy 3.X the main policy tools saw the 
establishment of the first Commission on Poverty (2005-2007), the introduction of 
Health Care Voucher, the set-up of Community Care Fund, the advent of 
Minimum Wage legislation, and the emergence of Work Incentive Transport 
Subsidy.  They were characterised to be more diverse, more direct handout of 
benefits, and more direct intervention. 
 
For diversity, they were observed to be in many different forms: monetary – 
payout through the Community Care Fund and Work Incentive Transport Subsidy; 
institution – the Commission on Poverty being a steering body and a collaborative 
platform for developing poverty alleviation polices and overseeing their 
implementation; voucher for exchange of services – the Health Care Voucher 
rendered to the elderly for health care services; and coercion – setting a 
mandatory wage floor with the legislation of a statutory minimum wage rate. 
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For direct handout, the Government was seen to give out transport subsidy for 
motivating the poor to enter or remain in the labour market.  There were 
initiatives to ration health care vouchers for alleviating the elderly’s burden on 
minor and common health care needs.  And the care fund would pay directly to 
target groups, especially those working poor, who did not live in public houses or 
enjoy other allowances or benefits, such as CSSA, tax rebate, etc.   
 
The legislation for minimum wage showcased another great leap of government 
approach to handle the poverty issue.  Before the legislation, there was a Wage 
Protection Movement for employees in the cleansing and guarding service sectors.  
Given the poor response from the business sector, the former Chief Executive 
announced in his Policy Address 2008-09 to proceed with the legislation work of 
a statutory minimum wage (para. 63, Policy Address 2008-09).  The minimum 
wage, which came into force in 2011 with a single rate for all sectors, had a 
widespread and mandatory influence on the labour market, on both the supply 
(workforce) and demand (employer) side, affecting family incomes and cost 
structures in business. 
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Pre-policy 4.0: Evolving Social Culture 
 
Institution for Policy Formulation and Implementation 
 
Poverty alleviation Policy 3.X had an equally important impact on the institutional 
and cultural end.  The 1st CoP (2005-07) had somehow suggested a designated 
and cross-sectoral policy steering body, being a policy tool and design, was 
generally recognised for effective poverty alleviation in Hong Kong.  It was 
especially so for the fact that the policies related to poverty alleviation fell within 
different policy bureaus and different implementation departments (such as 
Labour and Welfare Bureau, Home Affairs Bureau, Labour Department, Social 
Welfare Department).  Such institutional designs of the Commission on Poverty 
were conducive to collaborative efforts not only within the government, but also 
outside the government with academia and other related welfare sectors and 
communities. 
 
Social Re-construction of the Disadvantaged and Working Poor 
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It is argued that Policy 3.0 with the 1st CoP and the subsequent Policy 3.5 helped 
initiate a gradual social re-construction of the target populations as from the “not 
very deserving dependents”, to mainly “deserving dependents”, and then 
gradually to some extent “advantaged” groups.  The image re-framing allowed 
them to capture a better position to pursue their interests and therefore extended 
their political influence.   
 
Apart from the material and interpretative effects or benefits they had in Policy 
3.5 as mentioned above and analysed in detail in following paragraphs, members 
of the general public began to re-think that their poverty might more likely than 
not have a root in societal or governance failure.  It was increasingly evident that 
the disadvantaged or working poor became lesser and lesser penalised in the 
public domain that their difficulties were caused by themselves in the first place 
for failing to improve themselves and to work hard enough in earning higher 
incomes, and that they abused Hong Kong’s welfare systems to their unwarranted 
advantages. 
 
The social re-construction was also observed to be in part the result of numerous 
and regular studies or reports on poverty by relevant advocacy bodies in welfare 
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sector, such as the Hong Kong Council of Social Service (Chua, 2016) and Oxfam.  
These bodies also frequently held press conferences to highlight needy cases 
appealing for attention and support from members of the public in advocating 
their alleviation policies, such as setting up a poverty line.  
 
As a result, more political powers were distributed to target populations and 
welfare sectors through institutionalised interactions and connections, (like the 
platform of the Commission on Poverty), and also through the legitimised 
knowledge systems of those policy advocacy bodies.  The legitimisation saw 
their poverty research and study results being frequently used and quoted in 
official and formal discussions, like in Legislative Council meetings. 
 
 
Pre-policy 4.0: Evolving Target Population 
 
The Social Construction Model posits that policy tools and designs have both 
material and interpretative effects on the target populations, which were the 
disadvantaged and working poor since poverty alleviation Policy 3.X.  In respect 
of the material effects, the targets simply became better off and more resourceful.  
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For example, the elderly’s well-being in health was to some extent improved with 
the health care vouchers, the working poor’s incomes were boosted with the 
minimum wage and transport subsidy, and the disadvantaged groups’ living 
conditions were enhanced with the care fund’s payouts.  It is argued here that this 
resulted in a condition in which the target populations had more resources and 
capacity to take more heed of the poverty alleviation policies, and take more part 
in the advocacy and participation of further development polices for tackling 
poverty. 
 
On the front of the interpretative effects, it is also argued that the target 
populations experienced more positively with the policies as their non-subsistence 
needs, once largely neglected, were more proactively tended to.  They also 
experienced shifting interpretation within themselves.  Many of them started to 
scrap the ideas and notions that their being the disadvantaged or working poor 
were just burdensome to the society, or were merely unlucky in ending up where 
they were when receiving assistance or subsidy from the government or the 
society at large.  This front similarly led to a condition that the target populations 
were encouraged to have more participation in the evolution of policies for 
poverty alleviation. 
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Simply put the disadvantaged and working poor, through the material and 
interpretative effects, became more active, participative, and enthusiastic as they 
found the government increasingly responded to their plight, and that their plight 
justly deserved to be alleviated and lessened. 
 
 
Pre-policy 4.0: Policymaking Dynamics 
 
Under the Social Construction Model, the effects of previous (especially in Policy 
3.5) policy tools, target populations, and institutions and culture, which are 
expounded and elaborated above, affect and interact with the policymaking 
dynamics.  It in turn structures actors’ participation, resources allocation, and 
political orientation in producing Policy 4.0. 
 
In particular, the dynamics of policy entrepreneurs and interest groups mainly lied 
with the Hong Kong Council of Social Service (HKCSS, 2012, p.2-7), Oxfam, 
Society for Community Organizations, other bodies of the like in the welfare 
sectors, and their advocacy and social movements for a poverty line and poverty 
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alleviation measures.  For the dynamics of elected officials exercising their 
leadership, it was found to be CE LEUNG delivering his promise in his election 
manifesto to re-instate the Commission on Poverty and push ahead poverty 
alleviation measures as one of his most important policies in welfare.  
 
Regarding the problem reframing dynamics, it was reckoned to be also the 
gradual shift of governance under CE LEUNG’s regime that he “sought changes” 
with the notion of “appropriately proactive governance”.  Effectively the 
resultant tenet was that poverty problem could no longer be automatically solved 
or even lessened through only continued economic development in Hong Kong.  
It was indeed a structural and systematic problem that entailed proactive 
intervention from the government.  As far as policy designs were concerned, 
path dependency and heuristic shortcut by policy makers always came into play.  
With this, the re-use or re-instatement of the Commission on Poverty was a 
natural choice. 
 
The re-instatement of the Commission on Poverty and introduction of an official 
Poverty Line were argued to be a marked development in the government’s 
poverty alleviation policies as Policy 4.0 from 3.X.  It was because since its 
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existence subsequent major policy attempts were steered or overseen by the 
commission, such as the following large-budget policy initiatives of the Old Age 
Living Allowance (OALA) and Low-Income Working Family Allowance (LIFA). 
 
As one of the limitations of the Social Construction Model, which are elaborated 
in Chapter 2, the endogenous policy making dynamics are found to be insufficient 
in explaining drastic policy changes, like poverty alleviation policy from 3.X to 
4.0.  In this connection, the concepts of arrangement of governance and 
exogenous factors are introduced, seeking to build a refined model.  It is also 
mentioned that other policy process theories be borrowed to explains how the 
policy making dynamics work. 
 
For the leap from Policy 3.X to 4.0, the Multiple Streams Theory (Kingdon, 1995) 
is deployed here.  In essence, the problem stream sees the worsening problems of 
poverty and poor-rich gap, the policy stream sees the policy tools of the 
Commission on Poverty and official Poverty Line, and the political stream sees 
the political forces of interest and advocacy groups and the change of agenda 
priorities out of the change of the Chief Executive from CE TSANG to CE 
LEUNG.  For policy entrepreneurs, they are argued to be CE LEUNG and the 
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advocacy groups, especially the Hong Kong Council of Social Service who had 
been asking for the setting up of an official Poverty Line and active policy 
intervention for poverty alleviation.  HKCSS was reckoned to have bargaining 
power with influence on the 60 votes belonging to the welfare sub-sector in the 
Election Committee for Chief Executive (Electoral Affairs Commission, 2011).  
 
It is so argued that the policy entrepreneurs in the policy window of 2012 Chief 
Executive election coupled the above problem, policy and political streams in 
bringing about an important policy change and evolution from Policy 3.5 to 4.0, 
being the re-instatement of the Commission on Poverty and setting-up of an 
official Poverty Line.  The Policy 4.0 served as an important platform and 
vehicle for the government to continuously work on poverty alleviation in 
introducing subsequent major initiatives, and to objectively measure the 
effectiveness of its work and the initiatives. 
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Policy 4.0: Major Contents 
 
Policy 4.0: Commission on Poverty and Poverty Line 
 
The Commission on Poverty was re-instated in late 2012, right after the election 
of CE LEUNG as the Chief Executive.  The commission is tasked and positioned 
for poverty alleviation to review existing measures, identify areas of improvement, 
and deliberate on long-term policy strategies (Legislative Council Secretariat, 
2013).  It is chaired by the Chief Secretary for Administration, having a higher 
authority and hierarchy than the 1st CoP (2005-07) headed by the Financial 
Secretary. 
 
After less than one year, the Government in September 2013 announced Hong 
Kong’s first official Poverty Line.  As the concept of relative poverty instead of 
an absolute one, the line is set at half of the median monthly household income of 
Hong Kong’s domestic households before government intervention, such as 
taxation and social welfare benefit transfers. 
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Since 2013, the Government has published Hong Kong Poverty Situation Report 
for the previous year in an annual basis.  It places its analytical focus on the 
Poverty Line.  In the report for 2012-14 (Government of HKSAR, 2012, 2013, 
2014), the poverty thresholds (for all family sizes with one to over six members) 
went up as household income increased in general.  And the poor population 
after government intervention of recurrent cash allowance (e.g. Comprehensive 
Social Security Assistance, Disability Allowance, Old Age Living Allowance) 
dropped from 1.018 million in 2012 to 0.962 million in 2014.  And the poverty 
rate, also after recurrent cash allowance intervention, in the same period decreased 
from 15.2% to 14.3%. 
 
Continued Policy Evolution under the Refined Social Construction Model 
 
It is argued that following the milestone Policy 4.0 subsequent poverty alleviation 
policies have evolved and been rolled out under the refined Social Construction 
Model.  The governance principle and arrangement and exogenous factors 
causing the progression from Policy 3.X to 4.0 continue to be in force.  The 
prevailing policy tools and designs, especially Policy 4.0, continuously and 
progressively influence the target populations, institutions and cultures, and 
 114 
collectively with the former two the policy making dynamics.  These all lead to 
repeated cycles of policy evolution and the emergence of many substantial, in 
terms of budget, scope, and coverage of target populations, poverty alleviation 
policies.  The following paragraphs analyse two substantial ones, namely the Old 
Age Living Allowance and Low-Income Working Family Allowance. 
 
Policy 4.3: Old Age Living Allowance (OALA) 
 
CE LEUNG announced the introduction of OALA as early as in his election 
manifesto, which is meant to supplement living expenses of the elderly (65 or 
above) in need (Labour and Welfare Bureau, 2012).  From Hong Kong Poverty 
Situation Report 2014 and 2015 (Government of HKSAR, 2013; Government of 
HKSAR, 2014), since OALA being put into place in April 2013, 107,000 elderly 
people were reported to be lifted out of poverty by the policy (vs. 191 000 by 
CSSA)) with a total transfer of $10.1 billion (vs. $13.5 billion in CSSA) in 2013.  
In following year 2014, similar number of beneficiaries (107,800) and transfer 
($11 billion) were reported. 
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Policy 4.5: Low-Income Working Family Allowance (LIFA) 
 
CE LEUNG in Policy Address 2014 (January 2014) announced the roll-out of 
LIFA.  It is meant to lessen financial burdens of non-CSSA low-income working 
family, encourage the working family members to remain in the labour market for 
self-reliance, and to mitigate inter-generational poverty (Labour and Welfare 
Bureau, 2014).  With its implementation in mid-2016, LIFA is estimated to cost 
$3 billion per year, benefiting 200,000 families involving 710,000 persons.  It is 
also reckoned to lower the overall poverty rate by 2.1 percentage points (Labour 
and Welfare Bureau, 2016). 
 
 
Policy 4.0: Policy Tool Analysis 
 
The Commission on Poverty is reckoned to be the tools of “organisation” of 
Hood’s NATO as it stands out as an individual steering body and collaborative 
platform for poverty alleviation, which effectively is somehow government 
reorganisation in policy steering and overseeing, and use of various communities, 
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academia and voluntary organisation. 
 
For the Poverty Line, it obviously falls within the category of “nodality” of 
Hood’s NATO as it comprises of information collection and publication, with 
advice and exhortation. It is also found to be placed in the category of “sermons” 
of Vedung’s Sticks, Carrots & Sermons as it serves to influence people and their 
action by the dissemination and promulgation of information, knowledge, 
reasoned arguments and persuasion.  In particular, the last two poverty situation 
reports emphasised the need to help the working poor families, who had more 
dependents but relatively fewer breadwinners.  It coincided with the time in 
which the Commission on Poverty and government were set to introduce the 
Low-Income Family Allowance. 
 
Both OALA and LIFA, especially the latter, apparently belong to the category of 
“carrots” of Vedung’s Sticks, Carrots & Sermons, that of “treasure” (grants) of 
Hood’s NATO, and that of “inducements” of Elmore’s taxonomies of policy 
instruments.  LIFA is obviously to induce the poor to enter into, and the working 
poor to remain in, the labour market for self-reliance, which remains one of the 
guiding tenets of Hong Kong’s welfare system, especially for the able bodies.  In 
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fact, it has to some extent strains of capacity-building for prevention of 
cross-generation poverty as the children in low-income working families would 
benefit more for their education from the additional incomes (LIFA payouts) and 
less likely think of relying on unemployment CSSA when they grow up with their 
working parents as examples. 
 
 
Concluding Comments 
 
Douglass North discussed path dependency being a process constraining or setting 
the context of future development and choices, that “At every step along the way 
there are choices – political and economic – that provide…real alternatives.  
Path dependency is a way to narrow conceptually the choice set and link 
decision-making through time.  It is not a story of inevitability in which the past 
neatly predicts the future” (North, 1990, P. 98-9).  It is further argued here that 
out of path dependency the choice of poverty alleviation is conceptually and 
narrowed to largely only positive intervention from the government.  The choice 
of positive non-interventionism is no longer a choice.  And it is so argued that 
the choices of policy instruments of multiplicity and diversity among the 
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governance of positive intervention will continue to grow. 
 
The mainly Private self-governance regime in Policy 1.0 and combination of 
Private self-governance and Interventionist governance arrangement in Policy 2.0 
are reckoned not to be seen for a marked long period of time in the future given, 
which was evident since advent of Policy 3.0 and especially so since Policy 4.0.  
And the poverty alleviation policies in Hong Kong would continue to evolve 
progressively and incrementally, in a more vibrant and vigorous manner.  This 
notion is, apart from the path dependency, based on the systematic forces and 
policymaking dynamics of the refined model of the analytical framework.  Once 
the traction is gained and momentum in critical mass is reached, the policy 
evolution process will go on as repeated, and more importantly self-reinforcing, 
cycles.  And the process is reckoned to be accelerating in terms of multiplicity, 
intensity and sophistication, as what has been observed since Policy 4.0. 
 
In respect of the exogenous factors and macro socio-political context, which may 
have bearing on the policy evolution and design, are expected to remain largely 
status quo, or even worse in political context out of the societal malaise bred by 
the deadlock between pro-democracy camps/ people and Beijing central 
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government over democracy development in election of the Chief Executive and 
Legislative Councilors.  While the poverty and poor-rich gap problems have 
small signs of alleviation in Policy 4.X, other macro socio-political backdrop 
remains.  The government as argued in the beginning in this chapter can only 
resort to working mainly on improving the economic living and well-being of 
people, in which it has more institutional discretion and capacity.  It is expected 
more direct cash payout and in the form of non-means-tested, or at least to be 
called for by many members of the public, just like the recent demand for 
universal retirement protection.  Other forms of poverty alleviation measures 
besides cash payout can be required of and emerge at any time in the future. 
 
Against the above backdrop, the forthcoming Chief Executive election in 2017 
poses a big and opportune policy window for another policy evolution of 
substance.  Would the poverty alleviation policy evolve into Policy 5.0 with 
another heightened level of policy prominence, budget and target coverage scale? 
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CHAPTER 6  CONCLUSION 
 
General Observations 
 
This concluding chapter will summarise the findings of the evolution of poverty 
alleviation policy of Hong Kong from 1945 to the present time.  To conclude, 
Policy 1.0 consisted of only a few primitive initiatives which aimed at providing 
the basic necessities for the poor.  The content and volume were by no means 
sufficient compared with the large amount of the needy.  The piecemeal 
approach remained throughout the period from mid-1940s to early-1970s.  The 
situations continued until a great leap occurred when Policy 2.0 was introduced in 
1971.  Policy 2.0, since its establishment, remained the major policy content 
which lasted for 3 decades.  From 1970s to early-2000s, no major development 
of the policy was observed.  The accelerating rate of evolution in terms of 
diversity, intensity and sophistication occurred only after the establishment of the 
1st CoP (Figure 7).  What followed the 1st CoP were the minimum wage 
legislation, issuance of subsidiary and allowances to target groups, setting-up of 
poverty line, etc. 
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Figure 7: An Accelerating Rate of Policy Evolution 
 
 
The analytical model adopted in this project is able to explain the evolution of the 
poverty alleviation policy despite the presence of some limitations.  The research 
revealed that policy change was basically influenced by socio-political conditions, 
governance arrangements, social construction of target populations and their 
reactions to policy at the preceding stage.  Basically, the analytical model used in 
this project possesses exactly the infrastructure to dispose of these relevant factors, 
i.e. components one and two address the macro social conditions and governance 
arrangements.  Components three to five indicate how social construction, 
recipients’ reactions, and interactions of stakeholders in the policymaking 
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dynamics affect policy change.  In general, macro social situations and 
governance arrangements shortlist the feasible approach for policymaker to craft 
the policy designs.  Thus, the filtered policy contents will influence the target 
recipients, culture and institutions and policymaking dynamics and eventually 
lead to policy change (Schneider, Ingram and Deleon, 2014).  It was also 
observed if a particular policy has triggered more active responses from the 
community, the more vigorous the interaction among stakeholders within the 
policymaking dynamics would take place, and a higher degree of policy change is 
likely to occur.  Moreover, once the dynamics was stirred up, it attracted more 
attention and more frequent participation of stakeholders.  The result was that 
policy change became more rapid since stakeholders would eagerly and 
repeatedly engage in the policy formulation process and provide inputs in order to 
ensure the outputs (revised policy) would promote their interests.  Policy 3.0 and 
4.0 produced both material and symbolic effects that they shaped more positive 
image of the recipients that encouraged their participation.  The more attractive 
policy package also induces their frequent participation to seek further 
enhancement.  The aggregate effects led to an accelerating rate of the policy 
change as shown in Figure 7. 
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A Recap of the Policy Contents 
 
Based on diversity, intensity and sophistication, it is argued that the development 
of poverty alleviation policy can be divided into four phases.  Policy 1.0 was a 
primitive policy basket with few policy instruments included.  Given that the 
society was largely composed of refugees and the poor, policies such as low cost 
public housing were provided on humanitarian ground, i.e. to shelter the refugees.  
The governance mode was “Private self-governance”.  Due to the limited 
capacity of the government, it could barely deploy sufficient resources to take 
care of the poor, and it could at most passively respond to a portion of the welfare 
needs of the people.  The rest of the needs would be left unattended, and the poor 
had to rely on welfare organisations.  Since the government at the material time 
was incapable of producing a well-shaped poverty alleviation policy, no 
distinctive social construction of the poor was observed in the period of Policy 
1.0. 
 
Policy 2.0 was characterised as the setting up of the safety net by distributing cash 
(CSSA) to the needy in 1971.  As the economy flourished, improved financial 
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positions and for the sake of social stability, the government intently took up a 
more interventionist approach to handle the poverty problems, though it refrained 
from using the term of poverty.  The CSSA recipients on the one hand were 
constructed as the “dependents”, on the other hand the government tactfully 
attached a number of negative attributes by implying the recipients as “jobless”, 
“people could not take care of themselves”, etc.  The construction, to a certain 
extent, suppressed the recipients’ political participation to ask for more welfare 
benefits.  Nevertheless, from passive to active, Policy 2.0 was a great leap on 
poverty alleviation measure.  And the issuance of cash remained the core content 
of poverty alleviation for three decades until after the handover.   
 
Policy 3.0 was known as the establishment of the 1st CoP in 2005.  It marked as a 
milestone for the development of poverty alleviation policy of Hong Kong.  It is 
arguably that since then the government set up a “policy” for the (sole) purpose of 
poverty alleviation.  In fact, between 1990s – early 2000s, the social 
circumstances had become so complicated that Policy 2.0 could no longer cater 
for the needs of the poor.  At the material time, the rich-poor gap widened and 
the community was battered by the economy downturns.  CSSA recipients at the 
time were hence negatively constructed.  The anger and worried invoked from 
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the public evoked the legitimacy crisis to the HKSAR Government.  In response 
to the crisis, the Government adopted a combined form of Interventionist 
governance and Regulated self-governance approach (as a sole dominant agent in 
the policymaking dynamics).  As a result, the Government came up to establish 
the 1st CoP as the solution.  The Commission assumed both planning and 
steering role of the poverty alleviation policy.  Though the life span of the 1st 
CoP was short, it opened the gate for more sophisticated and multi-pronged policy 
instruments being introduced, such as the minimum wage legislation (“mandate” 
and “information”), provision of transport subsidies (“carrot” / “inducement”), etc.  
Given the positive attitude and prompt action of the Government, policy 
recipients were socially re-constructed from “not very deserving dependents”, to 
mainly “deserving dependents”.   
 
Policy 4.0 was composed of a bundle of intensive and sophisticated policy 
initiatives.  The core content was the CoP supplemented with Old Age Living 
Allowance, Low-income Working Family Allowance, and other ongoing policy 
measures.  The significance of the setting up of the poverty line expressed a very 
clear message to the community that it is a moral obligation for the government to 
uplift the people to live beyond that poverty level.  As such, policy recipients are 
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further positively constructed as the victims of inequality, which in turn invites 
their active participation in the policymaking dynamics to pursue more interests. 
 
 
Momentums for Policy Evolution 
 
As mentioned above, it was found that socio-political conditions, governance 
arrangements, social construction of target populations and their reactions to 
policy at the preceding stage are the driving force for policy evolution.  
Moreover, the direction, speed and intensity of change also depend on the degree 
of vigorous interactions of stakeholders within the policymaking dynamics.   
 
 
Socio-political Conditions 
 
Socio-political conditions was an important but not a sufficient factor for policy 
change.  In each individual policy phase, socio-political conditions permit 
certain policy options whilst filter out others.  For instance, the economic 
conditions of the community and financial situations of the Government during 
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the phase of Policy 1.0 constrained it from introducing intensified policy to tackle 
the poverty problem.  The improved economy during the era of Policy 2.0 
allowed the government to issue cash (CSSA) to the needy.  Again, the 
deteriorated economy during the pre-Policy 3.0 period (1997 – 2005) left the 
Government with no choice but tightened the control of issuing cash allowance.  
However, the legitimacy crisis and changing social circumstances in the same 
period forced the Government to establish the 1st CoP (Policy 3.0), which opened 
the gate for subsequent implementation of far more progressive poverty 
alleviation policy.  Policy 4.0, noted as an even more progressive policy, was 
inherited from the social trend that developed during Policy 3.0. 
 
Governance Arrangement 
 
Governance arrangement also determined the approach which the government 
would adopt to tackle poverty problem.  Private self-governance approach 
during Policy 1.0 period implies that the governance machine was 
underdeveloped to implement complex policy.  The Government’s priority to 
promote economic growth during Policy 2.0 era set the path for institutional 
building that favoured economic activities.  The institutional development for 
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handling welfare and poverty matters thus fell to a low priority in the 
Government’s agenda.  The 1st CoP was the intended extension of the executive 
arm to cater poverty issues.  Many corresponding institutional infrastructures 
were built to direct government resources to tackle poverty.  Policy 4.0 was a 
further intensification of the institutional setting to promote the poverty 
alleviation.  
 
Social Construction and Interactions within the Policymaking Dynamics 
 
Social construction of policy recipients and their responses matter to policy 
evolution.  It is observed that if recipients are socially constructed in a way that 
suppressed their political participation, the evolution of policy tends to become 
slow or even steady.  For instance, Policy 2.0 described that CSSA recipients 
were the needy whilst attached a number of negative attributes to suppress their 
application.  Their moderate participation allowed the government to control the 
agenda and political narratives in the policymaking dynamics.  Therefore, the 
Government faced no pressing need on policy amendment, and Policy 2.0 
persisted for a few decades.  In comparison, the increasing positive construction 
of the policy recipients induces more active participation in the policy making 
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process.  The Government was no longer the monopoly of the political narrative 
to the policy issue.  More frequent bargaining and negotiation took place in the 
dynamics during the era of Policy 3.0 and 4.0.  Thus more rapid and intensified 
policy changes were observed. 
 
 
Limitations of the Study and the Way Forward 
 
It is an important finding that the refined analytical model provides a possible 
explanation for interpreting the evolution of poverty alleviation policy of Hong 
Kong.  The model refined SCT’s explanatory power by introducing concepts and 
ideas from the theories of policy instrument and policy process.  It also expands 
the comprehensiveness by incorporating exogenous factors into the analysis.  
What’s more, poverty problem is something which matters to the livelihood of the 
public, so people’s sentiment, emotion, values, expectations are all highly relevant 
to and directly influential to the policy formulation.  Since SCT is the exact 
theory which focuses on how people’s social construction and participation affect 
the policy outputs and outcomes, thus, the model becomes a proficient device to 
reveal the momentum of policy change. 
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Along the way the research is conducted, it is observed that although the current 
model is compelling, there is still a number of possible ways which the model 
might be further sharpened and refined.  Subject to the constraints of time and 
manpower, and the confinement of the scope of the report, some additional 
elements were not discussed in this project.  Though they were not included in 
the report, it is worthy to produce an illustration of these elements which are 
considered to be conducive for conducting further research in relation to poverty 
alleviation.   
 
Element 1: A need for a set of standardised parameters to assess the variables 
 
To further refine the analytical model, a set of parameters that can standardise the 
assessment of the magnitude and vector of variables may be included.  The use 
of standardised parameters will assist researchers to ascertain (i) the scope of 
impact of a variable; (ii) how it ignites changes of various attributes; and (iii) the 
results of the impact, i.e. whether it multiplies or offsets the general effects of 
another variable.  With the assistance of the standardised parameters, it allows 
researchers to precisely and accurately describe the resultant force among the 
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factors which have induced any changes.  
 
Element 2: Consideration about the effects of policy diffusion 
 
The model has taken steps by considering the exogenous factors to the policy 
arena.  However, it can be drilled further by considering how policies from 
different subjects could have influenced the formulation of the poverty alleviation 
policy.  For instance, the contents of the poverty alleviation policy, to a certain 
extent, must have been influenced by the financial policy, housing policy, urban 
planning policy, immigration policy, etc.  This is owing to public resources being 
finite, and every government must make tough decisions and sacrifices when 
allocating resources for the use of different policies and purposes.  In case the 
integrated model could take into account the possible influence that may be posed 
by other major policies, it would help researchers to understand what policy 
options have been shortlisted or omitted.  They can provide a more accurate 
prediction to the policy outputs and outcome.   
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Element 3: When external factors are internalised 
 
For the sake of simplification, the model intently keeps those external factors as 
exogenous variables.  However, since policy contents would affect the culture 
and institution, it means that some exogenous variables may be internalised or 
incorporated into the system as the policy evolves.  Though the internalised 
process in the analysis might complicate the analysis, it will better articulate the 
dynamics for policy change.  As such, for future studies, researcher may try to 
advance the model by tracing how particulars variables evolve in parallel with the 
subject policy so as to reveal the more comprehensive dynamics for policy 
change. 
 
 
A Concluding Remark: Implications to Governance 
 
Policy is the prescription to the social problems at the material time.  It is also 
the summation of the effects of people’s wishes and efforts, planning and actions, 
strategies and reactions, and bargaining and interaction.  Policy evolves when the 
overall circumstances set off the ripple of a trend, then people step in to drive the 
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trend to a new stage.  This statement applies to the evolution of poverty 
alleviation policy of Hong Kong.   
 
From static to vigorous, the current policy is a reflection of the complex social 
situations and keen expectations from the public.  Given the conditions, it is 
opined that the development the poverty alleviation policy will simply become 
more and more diverse, intensifying and sophisticated.  Any trial of backward 
movement of the policy to its original form – such as the withdrawal or deduction 
of CSSA – may result in massive social unrest and cause a fatal wound to the 
legitimacy of the Hong Kong Government.  
 
From the societal point of view, poverty had become a structural problem of Hong 
Kong (Wong, 2011).  Channels for reasonable wealth redistribution and social 
upward movement are blocked.  It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, for 
the poor to uplift their living quality in the absence of sufficient social assistance 
(Goodstadt, 2013).  Thus, the macro socio-political situations would not allow 
the Government to withdraw itself from the duty of poverty alleviation. 
 
The present governance arrangements will cause the Government to further 
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advance its poverty alleviation policy.  Given the absence of universal suffrage 
and democracy, alleviating poverty and improved living standard become the 
sources of legitimacy for the Government.  In fact, it is argued that alleviating 
poverty has become a core governance principle of the HKSAR Government.  It 
is anticipated that the Government will further introduce arrangements that 
facilitate the implementation of the policy rather than withholding itself from 
tackling poverty issues. 
 
Lastly, the policy recipients as well as other stakeholders are evoked to join the 
policy formulation process.  They have the incentives and needs to urge and 
lobby the Government to introduce more drastic measures.  In order to promote 
and safeguard their interests, the recipients may ally with other interest groups to 
present their political narratives and to bargain and negotiate with the Government 
for more favourable terms.  The success in obtaining benefits now will 
encourage them to become even more eager to participate in the next round of 
negotiation.  Other groups may also be inspired and more tactful strategies will 
be introduced.  Therefore, it is anticipated that development of a more diverse, 
intensifying and sophisticated poverty alleviation policy will be the trend in the 
future.   
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